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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Pablo J. Morales 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
June 2018 
 
Title: Probing the Representation of Decision Variables Using EEG and Eye Tracking 
 
 
Value based decisions are among the most common types of decisions made by 
humans. A considerable body of work has investigated how different types of 
information guide such decisions, as well as how evaluations of their outcomes 
retroactively inform the parameters that were used to inform them. Several open 
questions remain regarding the nature of the underlying representations of decision-
relevant information. Of particular relevance is whether or not positive and negative 
information (i.e. rewards/gains vs. punishments/losses/costs) are treated as categorically 
distinct, or whether they are represented on a common scale. This question was examined 
across three different studies utilizing a variety of methods (traditional event-related 
potentials, multivariate pattern classification, and eye tracking) to obtain a more 
comprehensive picture of how decision-relevant information is represented A common 
theme among the three studies was that positive and negative types of information seems 
to be, at least initially, represented as categorically distinct (whether it be information 
about gains vs. losses, or value vs. effort). Additionally, integration of different types of 
information appears to take place during the later phases of the decision period, which 
may also be when distortions in the representation of value information (ex. loss 
aversion) may occur. Overall, this body of work advances our understanding of the 
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underpinnings of value based decisions by providing additional insight about how decision-
relevant information is represented in a dynamic and flexible manner. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The ability to evaluate information in the environment in order to inform decision 
making and goal-directed behavior is ubiquitous to all organisms. Generally, this process 
can be described as the sampling of evidence from to-be-decided-upon options until some 
criterion is met that directly promotes a decision among them. Critically, the accumulated 
evidence is converted into a decision variable (DV) on which some sort of criterion can 
be imposed (Shadlen & Kiani, 2013). The purpose of the DV is to map accumulated 
evidence onto the appropriate action for the organism. Such a general mechanism for 
information evaluation is a core component of cognition, and is flexibly applicable across 
domains. For example, both perceptual decision making based on objective stimulus 
properties and value based/economic decision making based on subjective attributions of 
options based upon the organism’s preferences or internal states utilize this common 
mechanism. Thus, decisions to determine which stimulus is brighter, which food item is 
healthier, whether or not to risk an uncertain gamble or choose a safe alternative, and 
whether or not to expend effort to obtain a reward follow this same fundamental process.  
Integral to advancing our understanding of decision making across organisms is to 
probe the underlying representations of behaviorally relevant DVs. Indeed, the advent of 
neuroscience has allowed for a more in-depth examination of where and when important 
DVs are represented and manipulated in the brain, and has led to the development of the 
multidisciplinary field of neuroeconomics (Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Rangel, Camerer, & 
Montague, 2008; Wyart, de Gardelle, Scholl, & Summerfield, 2012). Of particular 
interest for both economists and psychologists is understanding how information about 
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losses and gains is represented. Previous evidence suggests that the two are represented 
asymmetrically, with more psychological impact attributed to losses (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). This often leads can lead to attitudes like loss aversion, which favor 
avoiding losses, rather than pursuing equivalent gains. Similarly, it is unclear how value 
information for both intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of an object are processed. For 
example, are intrinsic benefits (ex. taste, appearance) of an object processed in the same 
manner as extrinsic costs (ex. effort)? Are these different types of information 
represented in a continuous, parallel manner, or a discrete, serial manner?   
The current work will address these topics in three separate studies, using 
behavioral, eye tracking, and neuroimaging methods. Generally, studying the decision 
process can be approached in several different ways; one approach is to focus on the 
decision phase itself (where DVs are generated) and probe how decision relevant 
information is being represented prior to choice. Alternatively, another approach is to 
focus on the outcomes of decisions to make inferences about how decision relevant 
information was represented prior to choice. The first study adopts the latter approach to 
clarify what information is represented in the feedback-related negativity (FRN), a well-
characterized ERP component believed to be associated with outcome processing. A wide 
body of literature has demonstrated that the FRN is sensitive to the valence of an 
outcome (i.e. losses/negative outcomes vs. gains/positive outcomes)(Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004; Sambrook & Goslin, 
2015), but the literature remains mixed regarding to what degree the FRN represents 
information about the probability and magnitude of outcomes (Alexander & Brown, 
2011; Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; San Martín, 
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René, Manes, Hurtado, Isla, & Ibañez, 2010). This might be due to experimental designs 
that don’t allow for each of these decision-relevant variables to be studied 
simultaneously. To address this, we designed a modified two-armed bandit task to assess 
how information about valence, probability, and magnitude of monetary losses and gains 
might be represented in the FRN. 
Although attitudes such as loss aversion, which may reflect underlying distortions 
in valuation, have been widely studied (Fox & Poldrack, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Yechiam & Hochman, 2013) it is unclear at 
what stage of processing the biases manifest. Is information about losses and gains 
processed in a manner reflective of loss aversion during initial valuation, or are these 
biases imposed only after information about gains and losses has been integrated? 
Furthermore, does loss aversion reflect a shift in the categorical boundary that separates 
losses and gains, or does it instead reflect a selective sensitivity to the magnitude of 
gains, but not losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)? The second study of the current work 
addressed this by employing a novel gambling task where optimal performance requires 
choices to be based on the integration of multiple pieces of evidence. This task, in 
conjunction with multivariate pattern classification methods inspired by previous 
neuroimaging work (Haxby et al., 2001; Kriegeskorte, 2008) offers an opportunity to 
map the representational space of value-related information during the decision phase in 
an attempt to directly address these questions.  
The value ascribed to an item under consideration is often times related to an 
intrinsic characteristic of that item (ex. taste, color, etc.). However, value can also be 
affected by characteristics that are extrinsic to the item (ex. the cost or effort required to 
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obtain the item). The degree to which information for both intrinsic and extrinsic 
attributes of an object are processed remains unclear. Few studies have examined whether 
these different types of information attributed to items under consideration (i.e. value vs. 
effort) are represented and ultimately integrated via parallel or serial processes (Harris, 
Adolphs, Camerer, & Rangel, 2011). The third study of the current work probed the 
dynamics of the representation of value and effort related information by utilizing eye 
tracking while subjects performed a value based decision task where in some instances, 
they were given foreknowledge about the presence of an effortful task that would be 
associated with one of the upcoming decision options. Such a design allowed us to 
independently track the online prioritization of effort or value information, as well as 
track when (if at all) the two types of information were integrated into something 
resembling a DV via fixation behavior. Furthermore, this gave us the opportunity to 
examine whether or not integration as indexed through visual fixations were actually 
predictive of choice. Such an approach provides insight into the temporal generation of 
behaviorally relevant DVs. Overall, this work implemented a multi-method approach to 
obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying representations of 
decision-relevant information that are critical for flexible decision making behavior. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FEEDBACK RELATED NEGATIVTY IS MODULATED BY VALENCE AND 
MAGNITUDE, BUT NOT PROBABILITY, OF OUTCOMES 
Introduction 
 In order to survive, it is fundamental for organisms to be able to monitor and 
evaluate the outcomes of their actions. Being able to distinguish whether an action 
resulted in a rewarding or non-rewarding/punishing outcome provides an opportunity to 
guide future behavior. Indeed, over the past several decades, advances in neuroscience 
have led to a search for whether there exist neural indicators of a flexible outcome 
monitoring system. A candidate signal that has been reliably established to evaluate 
outcomes across many studies is the so-called feedback-related negativity (FRN), an 
event-related potential believed to be elicited by the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
(Hauser et al., 2014; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). In virtually all studies examining 
the FRN, it has been shown to differentiate between feedback indicating correct and 
incorrect task performance, or (i.e. feedback valence). Specifically, a large FRN (negative 
deflection in the event-related potential) is typically present anywhere between 200-400 
milliseconds following the onset of incorrect –but not correct– feedback (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Holroyd, Larsen, & Cohen, 2004; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003; 
Miltner et al., 1997; San Martín, 2012; San Martín, Kwak, Pearson, Woldorff, & Huettel, 
2016). For example, during gambling tasks, it is common to see an FRN elicited 
following a gamble that results in a loss compared to a gamble that results in a gain. It 
should be noted that while an FRN following losses is the commonly reported effect, it 
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can respond flexibly to whatever the “worst” outcome is (see Holroyd, Larsen, and 
Cohen (2004)). This effect has been shown to occur irrespective of the modality of 
feedback (visual, auditory, tactile, etc.) (Miltner et al., 1997; Talmi, Atkinson, & El-
Deredy, 2013) and across a variety of tasks (time estimation, reinforcement learning, 
gambling, etc.) (Ferdinand, Mecklinger, Kray, & Gehring, 2012; Gehring, Goss, Coles, 
Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; San Martín, René, 
Appelbaum, Pearson, Huettel, & Woldorff, 2013).  
Although the FRN seems to serve as a robust categorical indicator for “good” or 
“bad” outcomes, a large body of research has also examined whether or not it carries 
additional decision-relevant parameters. Perhaps the most frequently investigated of these 
is whether or not the FRN carries information about the perceived probability of an 
outcome occurring. This is often discussed in terms of a reward prediction error (RPE), 
which is formally defined as the difference between the anticipated reward outcome 
(often derived by prior experience) and the delivered reward outcome, and is a common 
topic in reinforcement learning (Botvinick, Weinstein, Solway, & Barto, 2015; 
Cavanagh, Frank, Klein, & Allen, 2010; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Sambrook & Goslin, 
2014; Silvetti, Castellar, Roger, & Verguts, 2014; Zani & Proverbio, 2003). One of the 
first major theories to propose the functional significance of the FRN was the 
Reinforcement-Learning (RL) theory of the FRN (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). This theory 
posits that the FRN reflected a RPE elicited by the ACC. More specifically, it explicitly 
proposed that the FRN represented a negative RPE (-RPE) such that FRNs are elicited 
when feedback is indicative of outcomes that are worse than expected, rather than better 
than expected. RL theory was thus claimed that FRNs are typically the result of 
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unexpected losses, and that the size of the FRN should scale monotonically with the 
degree of unexpectedness. Thus, according to the RL theory, the FRN represents both the 
valence of the outcome (i.e. good vs. bad), and also the relative expectedness or 
probability of the outcome (as would be required to classify as a prediction error signal).  
Following the proposal of RL theory, a number of studies sought to explicitly test 
the claim that FRNs are the result of unexpected losses by designing studies where they 
vary the probability of a certain outcomes. At the time of publishing, there was little 
evidence aside from the study included in Holroyd and Coles’ (2002) paper proposing the 
RL theory of the FRN that suggested that it scaled with unexpected losses. Since then, a 
number of additional studies have described effects consistent with this theory, 
suggesting that the FRN reflects a –RPE. (Bellebaum, Polezzi, & Daum, 2010; M. X. 
Cohen, Elger, & Ranganath, 2007; Hewig et al., 2007; Martin & Potts, 2011; Walsh & 
Anderson, 2012). However, not all studies have produced effects consistent with RL 
theory; in several cases, FRNs produced by unexpected losses were equivalent to those 
produced by expected losses (Hajcak et al., 2005; 2006). However, an additional study 
conducted by the same group found that FRNs behaved in a manner consistent with RL 
theory when subjects were asked to predict the outcome of their choice prior to receiving 
feedback; here, unpredicted losses resulted in larger FRNs than predicted losses (Hajcak 
et al., 2007). These inconsistences suggest that this specific effect may be sensitive to 
subtle changes in task design, and thus the replicability of the effects proposed by the RL 
theory merit further investigation. 
In addition to the RL theory proposed by Holroyd and Coles (2004), more 
recently, Alexander and Brown (2011) have provided an alternate account as to how the 
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FRN may represent the probability of outcomes. They propose a prediction-response-
outcome (PRO) model, which posits that the FRN produced by the ACC instead reflects 
an unsigned prediction error (UPE). In contrast to the RL model, which claims the FRN 
is a signed prediction error (specifically, a negative prediction error), the PRO model 
claims that the FRN responds to the absolute deviation from expectation. As such, the 
PRO model predicts that equivalent FRNs should be elicited by both improbable gains 
and improbable losses; the model explicitly states that these responses should be agnostic 
to the valence of the outcome. This implies that the FRN reflects more of a generalized 
“surprise” signal, rather than one that is specific to –RPEs.  
Even prior to the publication of Alexander and Brown’s (2011) paper proposing 
the PRO model, there was some evidence to suggest the FRN reflected a UPE. One study 
found that during a difficult time estimation task where subjects were asked to rate their 
performance prior to feedback, a mismatch between their rating and the feedback would 
result in an FRN (Oliveira, McDonald, & Goodman, 2007). Importantly, this FRN would 
be elicited following both unpredicted positive and negative feedback, and was 
equivalent in both conditions. Following the proposal of the PRO model, several other 
studies found similar results using paradigms that involved time estimation (Ferdinand et 
al., 2012) as well as delivery/omission of monetary rewards and electric shocks (Talmi et 
al., 2013). However, most previous studies that have examined the FRN and have 
manipulated outcome probability have not found effects consistent with the PRO model. 
In some cases, unexpected events were actually observed to result in more positive 
waveforms (the FRN is a negative deflection) (Walsh & Anderson, 2011). The relative 
dearth of evidence suggesting the FRN behaves as a UPE as proposed by the PRO model, 
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as well as the inconsistencies with previous findings suggest that further investigation is 
required to better clarify the functional significance of the FRN. 
In addition to sensitivity to the probability of outcomes, a number of studies have 
examined if and how the FRN responds to the magnitude of outcomes. The RL theory 
proposed by Holroyd and Coles (2002) asserts that the FRN should behave in a manner 
that codes the magnitude of an outcome (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2004; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). Specifically, waveforms should be more negative 
following larger negative outcomes when compared to smaller negative outcomes, and 
should be more positive following larger positive outcomes when compared to smaller 
positive outcomes. In addition to the probability sensitivity proposed by RL theory, 
magnitude sensitivity would make the FRN sensitive the expected value of an outcome; 
that is, the value (magnitude) of the outcome weighted by the probability of the outcome.  
As with the numerous studies examining the degree to which the FRN carries 
information about the probability of an outcome, the evidence regarding whether it does 
the same for the magnitude of an outcome is mixed. Several studies have (to certain 
degrees) supported the idea that the FRN codes magnitude sensitivity in a manner 
consistent with RL theory (Bellebaum et al., 2010; Gu et al., 2011; Sambrook & Goslin, 
2014; San Martín, René et al., 2010). Interestingly, in some cases, magnitude sensitivity 
of the FRN is only found following either gains or losses, but not both. For example, 
Bellebeaum et al. (2010) showed that FRNs displayed magnitude sensitivity to only 
losses, whereas San Martin et al. (2010) showed the same effect but only for gains. The 
relative abundance of findings like these may be indicative of some sort asymmetry in 
loss/gain magnitude coding for the FRN. To make the picture even more unclear, several 
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studies have actually found the opposite of what is predicted by RL theory with regards 
to magnitude coding of the FRN, where larger outcomes resulted in smaller FRNs 
compared to smaller ones (Banis & Lorist, 2012; Kamarajan et al., 2009; Santesso, 
Dzyundzyak, & Segalowitz, 2011).  
Clearly, the literature is mixed regarding what sort of information is represented 
by the FRN. This may be due in part to experimental designs that emphasize specific 
parameters while neglecting others. At the very least, the FRN is a robust indicator of the 
relative “goodness” or “badness” of an outcome (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Walsh & 
Anderson, 2012). However, the probability and magnitude effects remain wildly 
inconsistent, especially in the former case with two mutually exclusive theories (RL and 
PRO) of how the FRN codes the probability of outcomes. Furthermore, in many 
instances, probability and magnitude effects are studied separately; either a study only 
manipulates magnitude, but hold probability constant, or vice versa (Bellebaum et al., 
2010; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; 2006; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Sambrook & Goslin, 2014). With theories such as RL theory proposing that the FRN may 
be modulated as a function of both probability and magnitude, it is necessary to develop a 
paradigm in which both probability and magnitude can be examined. In order to address 
these inconsistencies and clarify the informational content being represented by the FRN, 
the current work designed a gambling task specifically tailored to tease out the effects of 
outcome valence (loss vs gain), outcome expectancy (expected vs. unexpected), and 
outcome magnitude (large vs small) on the FRN. To further maximize the 
discriminability of effects, we performed trial by trial analyses using hierarchical linear 
modeling on the individual waveforms, rather than difference waves between the 
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averaged gain/loss waveforms, which allows us to tease out specific gain/loss related 
effects (e.g. magnitude effects). This approach will hopefully clarify the functional 
significance of the FRN in a manner that will further refine theory moving forward. 
Methods 
Participants 
 A total of 32 subjects (17 male) were recruited in return for monetary 
compensation ranging between $25 and $45. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and gave written informed consent according to procedures approved by 
the University of Oregon Institutional Review Board. 
Stimulus Displays 
 Stimuli for the task were generated in Matlab using the Psychophysics toolbox 
extension (Brainard, 1997).  They were presented on a 17-inch flat cathode ray tube 
computer screen.  Subjects viewed the screen from a distance of approximately 100 cm. 
Experimental Task 
Subjects were paid a base rate of $25 to perform 800 trials (8 blocks; 100 trials 
per block) of a modified 2-armed bandit task specifically designed to assess the 
responsiveness of the feedback-related brain activity to monetary outcomes of different 
valences (gain vs. loss), levels of expectancy, and magnitudes (high vs. low). Subjects 
were instructed that on each trial they had $10 of house money to gamble with, and that 
outcomes of each trial were entirely independent from one another (i.e. one could not 
accumulate money across subsequent trials). They were also told that in addition to their 
base pay, at the end of the experiment, one trial would be drawn at random, and any 
remaining money they earned through gambling ($0-20) would be theirs to keep. Each 
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trial began with the presentation of a central fixation cross in between two empty square 
frames for 500 ms. Following this, a probability cue was presented above fixation for 200 
ms that explicitly cued the probability of the current trial resulting in a gain. This 
information was communicated as a percentage that could be either a 30%, 40%, 50%, 
60%, or 70% chance of gain on the current trial. Each probability cue occurred an equal 
number of times per block. It is important to note that the probability of incurring a 
monetary loss on any given trial was equal to 1 minus the probability of reward (e.g. if 
the initial cue states that probability of gain is 40%, probability of loss is 60%). 1000 ms 
after the offset of the probability cue, a gambling option appeared inside each of the two 
previously empty frames; one was always a low option ($1-$5) and the other was always 
a high option ($6-10). The position of the low and high gambling options (left or right) 
was randomized, and each combination of low and high gambles occurred an equal 
number of times within each probability. Subjects had to indicate whether they would 
rather accept the left or right gamble via a key press using either the left (“z” key) or right 
(“?/” key) hand, respectively. Upon generating a response, the frame surrounding their 
chosen gamble was bolded for 800ms. Feedback for the outcome of their gamble was 
presented for 1500 milliseconds by having the entire chosen gamble change color (orange 
or blue) to indicate whether they had just gained or lost the amount of money they had 
gambled on (the colors indicating gains or losses were counterbalanced across subjects). 
See Figure 2.1 for a timeline of a trial of this gambling task. Critically, gambling 
outcomes played out exactly to their probabilities; exactly 30% of trials with the 30% cue 
were wins, while the other 70% were losses, etc. Each trial was separated by a 500 
millisecond intertrial interval. At the end of the experiment, one trial was drawn at 
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random, and the monetary outcome was applied to an endowment given to the subject 
prior to the study. Any remaining money was theirs to keep afterwards. 
Electrophysiological Recording, Processing, and Analysis 
 EEG was recorded from a cap with 22 embedded Ag/AgCL electrodes 
specifically designed for EEG recording (Electrocap International) using the 10/20 
system of electrode placement.  Electrode sites included F3, FZ, F4, T3, C3, CZ, C4, T4, 
P3, PZ, P4, P03, P04, P0Z, T5, T6, O1, O2, OL, and OR.  All electrode sites were 
referenced to the left mastoid, and all data was re-referenced off-line to the algebraic 
average of the left and right mastoids.  Horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) were 
recorded from electrodes placed approximately 1 cm to the left 
 
Figure 2.1.  Timeline of a trial for the gambling task. 
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and right of the external canthi of the eyes of each subject to measure horizontal eye 
movements. Vertical EOG were recorded to detect subject eye blinks from an electrode 
placed beneath the left eye and referenced to the left mastoid. Impedances of all channels 
were kept below 5 kW. EEG and EOG signals were amplified with an SA Instrumentation 
amplifier with a bandpass filter of 0.01-80 Hz and were digitized at 250 Hz in LabView 
6.1 running on a PC. 
 EEG data were preprocessed offline in MATLAB (MathWorks) using the 
EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and custom scripts. For each trial, raw 
EEG was separated into 1200 millisecond epochs time-locked to the onset of the 
feedback stimulus (200 milliseconds pre-stimulus, 1000 milliseconds post-stimulus). The 
200 milliseconds pre-stimulus portion served as a baseline. Trials with vertical eye 
movements in excess of 300 µV across a 200 millisecond sliding window, or horizontal 
eye movements in excess of 35µV across a 250 millisecond were excluded from 
analyses. 
 A large body of previous work has suggested that the FRN is fronto-centrally 
localized and peaks anywhere between 200-400 milliseconds post-feedback. (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Sambrook & Goslin, 
2015). Thus, the FRN was operationalized as the mean voltage between 260-360 
milliseconds post-feedback at channel FZ (this time window was chosen based upon a 
visual inspection of the grand average loss vs. gain waveforms).  
Results 
Choice Behavior Reveals Probability Matching  
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 Binary logistic hierarchical linear models were constructed in R (R Core Team, 
2016) using the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) to assess 
whether subject’s trialwise choice behavior (bet low or bet high) was sensitive to the 
probability cue indicating the explicit probability of experiencing a gain on that trial 
following their choice. A full model was constructed which specified both random 
intercepts (subject ID) and random slopes (probability) where trials (level 1) were nested 
within subjects (level 2). There was a significant linear effect of probability (b = 4.52), z 
= 10.24, p < .001 demonstrating that as the probability of experiencing a gain increased, 
the proportion of high bets likewise increased in a linear fashion (see Figure 2.2). This 
supports evidence for probability matching during the task, rather than adopting a more 
optimized strategy (i.e. always betting low when probability of gain < 50%, always 
betting high when probability of gain > 50%, and betting randomly when probability of 
gain = 50%). Additionally, there was significant quadratic effect of probability (b = 
4.52), z = 10.24, p < .001, suggesting that the propensity to choose the high bet decreased 
as probabilities approached maximal uncertainty (i.e. the 50% probability cue). 
 
Figure 2.2. Proportion of high bets across different probabilities of winning 
in the gambling task.    
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FRN Responds Primarily to Valence and Magnitude of Outcomes 
 Hierarchical linear models were constructed in R (R Core Team, 2016) using the 
lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) to assess which of the three experimental factors best 
explained modulations in FRN amplitude: outcome valence (gain/loss), magnitude of 
outcome (high/low), of outcome, and probability. A full model was constructed which 
specified both random intercepts and random slopes for each factor where trials (level 1) 
were nested within subjects (level 2). Consistent with previous literature (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004), there was a main 
effect of outcome valence (b = 2.06), t = 6.59, p < .001; FRNs were larger (i.e. more 
negative) following losses (M = 4.18, SE = 0.09) when compared to gains (M = 6.60, SE 
= 0.10). With regards to the PRO model proposed by Alexander and Brown (2011), since 
the predictor used in this model reflected the probability of gain, a main effect of 
probability as described by the PRO model would best be captured by a quadratic 
function, rather than a linear one in order to represent a symmetric effect of the FRN on 
each side of the range of probabilities (where either wins or losses are more expected).  In 
contrast with the PRO model, there was no quadratic effect of probability (i.e. UPE) 
observed with the FRN, (b = 0.53), t = 1.42, p = ns. However, there was also a main 
effect of outcome magnitude (b = 0.97), t = 2.36, p < .05; FRNs were smaller following 
high magnitude outcomes (M = 6.28, SE = 0.10) when compared to low magnitude 
outcomes (M = 4.72, SE = 0.09). 
 In addition to the main effects, there were several significant interactions that 
informed how information about valence, probability, and magnitude might be carried in 
the FRN. There was a significant two-way interaction between outcome valence and 
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magnitude (b = 1.03), t = 2.72, p < .01. This interaction was primarily driven by the fact 
that FRNs were significantly diminished (i.e. the waveforms were more positive) 
following high magnitude gains. Thus, it appeared that FRNs were only sensitive to the 
magnitude of gains, but not losses. Interestingly, a significant three-way interaction (b = -
2.54), t = -2.80, p < .05 indicated that high magnitude gains that are more expected 
actually result in larger FRNs. This specific result is difficult to interpret a point that will 
be revisited in the discussion. Figure 2.3 shows waveforms for all possible valence, 
probability and magnitude conditions. See Figure 2.4 for mean FRN amplitudes in the 
260-360 millisecond time window. 
 
 
Figure 2.3.  Grand average waveforms time-locked to the onset of the feedback for 
every combination of valence, probability, and magnitude condition. 
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 Discussion 
 The ability to accurately monitor the outcomes of our actions is essential for 
survival. The so-called feedback-related negativity (FRN) is an event-related potential 
that is widely believed to be a neural indicator of outcome monitoring. Aside from coding 
the relative “goodness” or “badness” of an outcome, the degree to which the FRN is 
sensitive to additional choice-relevant parameters is unclear, despite several theoretical 
models which attempt to establish the functional role of the FRN in carrying information 
about the probability and magnitude of the outcomes experienced (Alexander & Brown, 
2011; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). The current work sought to clarify these inconsistencies 
by designing a paradigm that simultaneously tests effects of valence, probability, and 
magnitude of outcomes on the amplitude of the FRN. Overall, it was found that the FRN 
was primarily sensitive to the valence of the outcome, consistent with the overwhelming 
majority of previous literature examining the FRN. Additionally, there was no evidence 
Figure 2.4. Mean FRN amplitudes across the 260-360 millisecond time window for all 
conditions (higher bars indicate smaller FRNs). 
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to suggest that the FRN was selectively sensitive to the probability of an outcome in 
either a manner consistent with a –RPE or UPE. Finally, there was some degree of 
modulation of the FRN by the magnitude of outcomes, but this was primarily driven by 
the outcome of gains, not losses. Each of these results will be discussed further in the 
following sections. 
The current work found a very large effect of outcome valence on the amplitude 
of the FRN; FRNs were overall larger (i.e. more negative) following feedback for losses, 
and smaller following feedback for gains. This result is unsurprising, since it is the result 
that helped bring the FRN into the forefront of ERPs putatively associated with outcome 
monitoring via feedback (Miltner et al., 1997). The current work adds to an already large 
body of literature to suggest the FRN likely represents the output of an outcome 
monitoring systems that to some extent bins outcomes along a binary good/bad 
dimension (Hajcak et al., 2006). This result further reinforces a large body of literature 
that the FRN in part represents the motivational value of ongoing outcomes.  
The FRN Does Not Respond to Outcome Probability 
The current work did not find any strong evidence to indicate that the FRN is 
sensitive to the probability of an outcome. This contrasts with both the RL and PRO 
models, which propose that the FRN behaves like a –RPE, and UPE, respectively. Our 
results are largely consistent with studies like that of Hajcak et. al (2005), who found that 
probability of an outcome did not modulate the amplitude of the FRN, but inconsistent 
with numerous other studies that have found such an effect. This may be fundamentally 
due to the nature of the task employed in the current work; we utilized a gambling task 
that explicitly cued the probability that the current trial would result in a gain, and then 
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allowed subjects to freely choose what kind of bet they wanted to place. In this task, the 
relevant probability information was provided explicitly, and subjects did not have to 
(and technically could not) learn the optimal response strategy via reinforcement 
learning. Interestingly, this feature of explicit instruction of the probability of reward was 
also found in Hajcak et al. (2005), who failed to find an effect of outcome probability on 
the amplitude of the FRN.  
To clarify some of the instances in which the FRN did not respond like a –RPE, 
Holroyd (2009) designed a series of experiments to probe necessary conditions that need 
to be met in order for the FRN to behave in such a manner. The first of these experiments 
was a replication of the original Hajcak (2005) study but with more extreme probability 
conditions; rather than conditions that reflected 25%, 50%, and 75% chance of reward, 
Holroyd et al. (2009) used 5%, 50%, and 95% (in response to the suggestion by Hajcak et 
al. (2005) that the FRN may only respond to extreme expectancy violations). Here, using 
an experiment where probability of reward was explicitly cued prior to choice, they found 
at least partial support for RL theory; unexpected losses resulted in larger FRNs than 
expected losses, but the relationship between unexpected, expected, and equiprobable 
losses was not monotonic. This effect though, was considerably weaker than previous 
studies that provided support for RL theory. In experiments two and three, subjects were 
required to actually learn the optimal response strategy via trial-and-error. However, in 
experiment two, despite subjects believing that they had learned the optimal strategy, 
feedback was random. In contrast, in experiment three, feedback was truthful and directly 
the result of having learned a response strategy. The results of experiment two mirrored 
those of experiment one, but experiment three demonstrated a monotonic sensitivity of 
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the FRN to outcome expectedness, consistent with what is predicted by RL theory 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
The work of Holroyd (2009) thus strongly suggests that the experimental factors 
that need to be present in order for the FRN to behave in the way predicted by RL theory 
are that subjects need to actually learn a response strategy via trial-and-error, and that 
feedback needs to be truthful to their responses. In contrast, the current work, as well as 
Hajcak et al. (2005) did not utilize a task in which subjects could learn an optimal 
response strategy, due to explicitly providing subjects with the probabilities of reward 
prior to having to make a choice. When discussing why Hajcak et al. (2005) failed to find 
–RPE effects of the FRN, Walsh and Anderson (2012) suggested that subjects may not 
have had sufficient experience in the three probability conditions present in their 
experiment to develop strong enough expectations that could subsequently be violated in 
a manner that would result in a –RPE, or that the explicit probability cue did not directly 
map on to subjects’ expectations (Hajcak et al., 2007). Although the current work did not 
allow for subjects to traditionally learn a strategy (like Hajcak et al. (2005)), one 
advantage of the current design is that we are able to indirectly assess subjects’ 
expectations of the outcomes in each of the five probability conditions through their 
choice behavior. Here, subjects behaved in a way that indicated an attempt to maximize 
their earnings and minimize losses (i.e. betting high when the probability of winning is 
high, and betting low when the probability of winning is low). Furthermore, outcome 
probabilities within each probability condition were not manipulated in any way; 
participants very likely experienced violations of expectations. It is very unlikely that 
subjects in the current experiment did not have any expectations about the trial outcomes 
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in the different probability conditions. Whether or not this was insufficient to create an 
expectation whose violation would be manifested in the amplitude of the FRN is 
something that needs to be more carefully studied. This is further reinforced by the fact 
that other work has demonstrated that learning via instruction vs. trial-and-error does not 
result in quantitatively different FRN responses (Walsh & Anderson, 2011). 
In addition to the FRN not behaving like a –RPE as predicted by RL theory, the 
current work found no evidence that the FRN behaves like a UPE, as predicted by the 
PRO model. This was the case even when the current task included losses and gains that 
equally unexpected, and in principle, should have both resulted in an FRN if the PRO 
model is correct. Evidence in support of the PRO model is fairly limited, with only a few 
studies demonstrating that the FRN can behave in a manner consistent with an UPE 
(Ferdinand et al., 2012; Oliveira et al., 2007; Talmi et al., 2013). Additionally, these 
experiments employ tasks that are quite different from the traditional reinforcement 
learning or gambling tasks often used when studying the FRN; Talmi et al. (2013) used a 
completely passive task where subjects were cued to receive either rewards or painful 
electric shocks that were either delivered or omitted, Oliveira et al. (2007) used a difficult 
motion estimation task where subjects had to rate their performance prior to receiving 
feedback about their performance, and Ferdinand et al. (2012) used difficult time 
estimation task. Ferdinand et al. (2012) criticized the use of gambling tasks to evaluate 
models like the PRO model for several reasons. First, they state that since gambling tasks 
do not typically offer opportunities for behavioral adjustment (similar to the findings of 
Holroyd et al. (2009)) and thus likely do not result in participants developing 
expectations of the outcomes, and that gambling tasks do commonly deliver gains and 
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losses in an equiprobable manner (see Gehring and Willoughby (2002)). Neither of these 
criticisms apply to the current task when you consider subject choice behavior, and the 
fact that we explicitly manipulated the probability of outcomes to not be purely 
equiprobable. Thus, it is unclear why there was no overall main effect of outcome 
expectancy on FRN amplitudes. One possibility is that the current task was not engaging 
enough to result in equally salient expectancy violations for both the loss and gain 
domains. The tasks that have shown the FRN behaving like a UPE have been either very 
difficult (Ferdinand et al., 2012; Talmi et al., 2013) or incredibly salient by using stimuli 
like painful electric shocks (Oliveira et al., 2007).  
The FRN Responds to Outcome Magnitude, but Only for Gains 
 Despite the mixed literature regarding whether or not the FRN carries information 
about the magnitude of the outcome, the current work found a reliable main effect for 
outcome magnitude on the amplitude of the FRN. However, this main effect was 
qualified by an interaction that demonstrated that this magnitude was largely present for 
just gains, and not losses. Specifically, higher gains, as opposed to smaller gains, resulted 
in smaller FRNs/more positive waveforms overall. This is consistent with the results of 
San Martin et al. (2010), and only partially consistent with the RL theory prediction that 
larger losses should produce larger FRNs, and larger gains should produce smaller 
FRNs/more positive waveforms  (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015). 
San Martin et al. (2010) explain their results by suggesting that the fact that FRNs were 
smaller following larger gains might have been due to a general loss avoidance strategy, 
whereby a greater value is placed on avoiding losses, which is reflected in more positive 
waveforms following large gains. Additionally, it has been suggested that these ERPs 
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following gains actually reflect subcortical reward-related processing (e.g. from the 
ventral striatum) (Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; Proudfit, 2015), and as 
such, it is reasonable that these ERPs would scale with the magnitude of gains. A 
complimentary explanation for the magnitude effect present only for gains but not losses 
is that the FRN to some extent reflects the asymmetric valuation of gains and losses as 
proposed by Prospect Theory (Fox & Poldrack, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 1992). Such an explanation would explain why the FRN 
would not scale with magnitude of losses, since the proposed utility function for losses is 
markedly steeper, allowing less discriminability between losses of different magnitudes 
(i.e. similarly sized FRNs). In contrast the comparatively more gradual utility function for 
gains might allow for finer discriminability for gains of different magnitudes to produce 
the effects observed in the current study.  
 In the current work we also observed a significant three-way interaction between 
valence, the linear effect of probability of gain, and magnitude. This interaction indicated 
that high, expected gains actually resulted in larger FRNs (i.e. more negative 
waveforms). This is a somewhat anomalous finding that is difficult to interpret; if the 
FRN behaves as a true expected value signal, according to RL theory, one would expect 
that it FRNs would be smaller following high, expected gains. However, our findings are 
not consistent with that notion. Furthermore, this is the only significant effect that 
included an effect of probability of the outcome. In any case, it does not offer clear 
support for either the RL theory or the PRO model. 
Limitations 
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 One limitation of this study were the low bin counts for certain conditions. This 
was particularly apparent in the high gain probability/bet low/lose and low gain 
probability/bet high/win. The design of this study provided subjects with free choice, and 
thus actually required them to make choices to populate the various condition bins. This 
was compounded by the fact that the probability conditions resulted in outcomes that 
were true to the cued probabilities and not manipulated in any way. However, this was to 
a certain degree accounted for by relying on trial by trial analysis of EEG using 
hierarchical linear modeling, which can help mitigate the effects of low bin counts. 
Additionally, in the current task, it is possible that magnitude and probability are 
confounded, since the probability cues so strongly influenced choice behavior. This 
further justifies our analytical approach by independently teasing out the effects of 
probability and magnitude on a trial-by-trial basis. These experimental design choices 
were necessary in order to simultaneously test the effects of valence, probability, and 
magnitude on the FRN. If instead we only manipulated magnitude or probability across 
blocks, the task would become less engaging. This is problematic because it has been 
demonstrated that FRN effects are actually reduced the more passive a task becomes, and 
this reduction is correlated with subject ratings of task engagement (Yeung, Holroyd, & 
Cohen, 2005). 
Conclusions 
 The current work sought to clarify what type of information is carried by the 
feedback-related negativity, a purported index of active outcome monitoring. Our 
findings helped further reinforce that at the very least, the FRN is a powerful indictor of 
the valence of an outcome, and correctly and coarsely distinguishes between them along 
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an abstract “good” or “bad” dimension. The lack of strong support for either the RL 
theory and PRO model with regards to the sensitivity of the FRN to –RPEs/magnitude 
and UPEs, respectively, in conjunction with the mixed support for these models in the 
literature, suggests that either they do not completely capture the true nature of the type 
of information carried in the FRN, or that the behavior of the FRN is highly contingent 
upon the type of task one is using to examine it. With regards to the lack of –RPE effects 
predicted by RL theory, claims of subjects not having clear expectations of the likely 
outcome of a trial (Walsh & Anderson, 2012) seem dubious considering how subjects 
made gambling choices in a way that indicated an expectation of the likely outcome of a 
trial given the initially cued probability. Thus, future work should better characterize 
whether or not behaviorally revealed expectations in tasks where no optimal response 
strategy can be learned are insufficient in contributing to expectancy violation/RPE 
effects that would manifested in the amplitude of the FRN. Finally, the fact that 
magnitude effects were present only for gains and not losses suggests that the FRN may 
to some degree represent value in an asymmetric manner, similar to the asymmetric 
utility functions proposed in Prospect Theory. Overall, the current work provides the 
impetus to more critically assess a number of proposed theories of the functional 
significance of the FRN. 
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CHAPTER III 
WHEN DO DISTORTIONS IN VALUATION MANIFEST? 
Study one demonstrated that signals like the FRN robustly distinguish between losses 
and gains in a categorical manner. Despite the fact that the FRN did not seem to be 
sensitive to the probability of an outcome, it did seem to carry information about the 
magnitude of an outcome. Specifically, the FRN distinguished between the high and low 
magnitude gains, but not losses. This result is consistent with an asymmetric 
representation of gains and losses (Fox & Poldrack, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
whereby losses are processed in a more “all or none” manner regardless of magnitude, 
while preserving the sensitivity to the magnitude of gains. This is the hallmark of the 
valuation distortion known as loss aversion. Since the FRN largely represents the 
evaluation of an outcome presumably after all decision-relevant information has been 
computed to guide choice, it is unclear when these biases manifest during the decision 
process itself. This question, among others, was explored in study two. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MULTVARIATE PATTERNS OF DELTA BAND ACTIVITY SHOW THE 
EMERGENCE OF LOSS AVERSION AFTER INTEGRATION OF VALUE 
Introduction 
Among the most common types of decisions made by humans are value-based 
decisions (ex. where to go for dinner, whether to make a risky gamble or play it safe, 
etc.). However, the efficiency in which we engage in these decisions is far from optimal; 
a large body of literature has demonstrated that humans are prone to distortions in 
valuation that manifest themselves in systematic biases during decision making 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Among the most well-known of these biases is loss 
aversion, in which individuals tend to prefer making decisions that avoid losses rather 
than those that result in equivalent gains. This tendency is believed to be the result of a 
valuation distortion best described by asymmetric differences in the calculation of 
subjective value (i.e. utility) for gains and losses. More specifically, Prospect Theory 
proposed that the utility function for losses is steeper than that for gains, suggesting that 
the psychological impact of losing is about twice as large as that of the equivalent gain 
(Fox & Poldrack, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). This 
has been succinctly captured by the adage, “losses loom larger than gains” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991).  
To date, it is not clear at what stage of processing these valuation distortions 
occur. In many instances, decision making takes place in two discrete stages; an initial 
valuation of multiple pieces of evidence, followed by an integration of that evidence into 
a decision variable (DV) upon which some sort of criterion can be imposed to guide 
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behavior (Shadlen & Kiani, 2013; Wyart et al., 2012). This two-stage approach provides 
a framework to directly assess when distortions such as loss aversion manifest 
themselves. For example, loss aversion could be due to an overweighting of losses during 
an initial valuation stage for each individual piece of evidence being considered for a 
final decision. Alternatively, information might be represented adequately at the initial 
valuation stage, but then integrated in a biased manner (i.e. during the calculation of 
expected value). Moreover, within each stage, such a loss-aversion bias during 
integration could occur in different manners. For example, it may represent a shift in the 
criterion with regard to where exactly the boundary between gains and losses is set (i.e. 
an intermediate categorical boundary vs. a shifted categorical boundary). Another 
possibility is that there is an asymmetry with regard to the precision with which gains 
versus losses are represented. Specifically, loss aversion would imply that losses are 
represented in an all-or-none manner (consistent with a very steep subjective value 
function in the loss domain), whereas gains may be represented in a more fine-grained 
manner, allowing a distinction between low and high gains (i.e. a selective continuous). 
See Figure 4.1 for a schematic of when biases such as loss aversion might occur. 
 
Figure 4.1. Schematic representation of stages of processing for value information. 
Right side illustrates different possible representations of value, which could occur 
either during initial valuation or later integration.  
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Investigating what stage of processing may produce distortions of valuation 
necessitates a task where optimal performance requires both valuation and integration 
stages. A model task that meets these requirements is the multi-sampling perceptual 
decision making task employed by Wyart, de Gardelle, Scholl, and Summerfield (2012). 
In their task, subjects were presented with a stream of eight Gabor patches at a rate of 4 
Hz, and then had to decide whether the overall orientation of the stream of patches fell 
more along cardinal or diagonal axes. In order to optimally perform this task, the 
orientation of each Gabor patch should be transformed into a DV that categorizes each 
patch as either cardinal or diagonal (i.e. valuation). Critically, this DV would need to be 
updated throughout the trial with the presentation of each subsequent Gabor patch (i.e. 
integration) in order for the correct stimulus category (cardinal or diagonal) to be 
estimated more precisely. This basic multi-sampling design could be adapted to feature 
value based, rather than perceptual, decision making to better address what stage of 
processing loss aversion may occur.  
Previous work has examined how loss aversion might be represented in humans 
through activity in putative valuation circuits such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC) (Canessa et al., 2013; Tom et al., 2007) as well as through event-related 
potentials that respond to value such as the feedback-related negativity (FRN) 
(Kokmotou et al., 2017; San Martín, René et al., 2010). However, neither of these are 
appropriate measures for a multisampling context where information is presented at a 
rapid rate. A candidate neural signal that been demonstrated to be informative in such a 
context are EEG oscillations in the delta band (~1-3 Hz) (Wyart et al., 2012). In their 
task, Wyart et al. (2012) found that the DV associated each Gabor patch could be 
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predicted along various points in the phase of oscillations in the delta band (~1-3 Hz), 
suggesting that these low frequency EEG oscillations may carry information about DVs 
that could be subsequently integrated to inform behavior. In addition to its utility in a 
multisampling context, numerous other studies have suggested that the power of 
oscillations in the delta band may contain information about rewards (Bernat, Nelson, & 
Baskin-Sommers, 2015; Foti, Weinberg, Bernat, & Proudfit, 2015; Knyazev, 2007; 
2012). Taken together, this suggests that delta power may contain information that could 
support the representations of value necessary to guide choice during value based 
decision making. 
Rather than relying on traditional, univariate analyses, it could also be possible to 
map the representational space of value based information in delta power using a series of 
newer computational methods have been previously used “decode” complex, multivariate 
patterns of neural activity (Haxby et al., 2001; Kriegeskorte, 2008; Kriegeskorte et al., 
2008). These methods, along with others such as representational similarity analysis 
(RSA; (Kriegeskorte, 2008)), and those utilized by Wyart et al. (2012)  provide a basis 
upon which to design studies to better probe the informational content carried by various 
types of neural data. For example, these multivariate decoding methods could be 
leveraged to create confusion matrices to see whether or not information about value is 
arranged in a meaningful manner. In the case of the current work, confusion matrices 
could be used to assess whether delta power contains information that supports the 
presence and position of a categorical gain/loss boundary, as well as whether or not there 
is sensitivity to the magnitude of gains or losses. Such representations would directly 
inform how loss aversion might manifest in representations of value. 
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Taken together, the current work employed a novel approach to investigate what 
stage of processing of value information produces distortions such as loss aversion. We 
recorded EEG from human subjects as they performed a novel multi-sampling gambling 
task based on the multi-sampling perceptual decision making task of Wyart et al. (2012). 
During each trial, subjects were presented with a stream of eight pieces of value 
information (hereby referred to as elements) that they had to integrate in order to decide 
whether to select either a safe bet or a risky gamble. Critically, analyses took place 
separately at the element (valuation) level and the entire stream (integration) level. We 
began by decoding ranges of element-level or stream-level values subjects experienced 
over the course of the task from multivariate patterns of delta power across the scalp. We 
then mapped the representational space of value by creating 4x4 confusion matrices that 
reflected the distribution of decoding accuracies for both high and low gains and losses. 
If the value information carried in delta power is susceptible to distortions such loss 
aversion, we would expect one of the following: 1) a shift in a categorical gain/loss 
boundary that resulted in only high gains to be categorized as gains, or 2) a sensitivity to 
the magnitude of gains, but not losses, consistent with a very steep subjective value 
function in the loss domain. Due to the absence of previous work examining when loss 
aversion may occur during the processing of value information, the current work did not 
have strong predictions as to whether loss aversion would occur at the element or stream 
level. Overall, this study provides a novel way to investigate the possible underlying 
structure of and temporal manifestation of loss aversion by using a task and analytical 
approach that decouples two fundamentally different levels of processing.  
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Methods 
Participants 
 A total of 24 subjects (3 male) were recruited in return for monetary 
compensation ranging between $20 and $40. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and gave written informed consent according to procedures approved by 
the University of Oregon Institutional Review Board. 
Stimulus Displays 
 Stimuli for the task were generated in Matlab using the Psychophysics toolbox 
extension (Brainard, 1997).  They were presented on a 17-inch flat cathode ray tube 
computer screen.  Subjects viewed the screen from a distance of approximately 100 cm. 
Experimental Task 
We recorded EEG from subjects as they performed 875 trials of a novel 
multisampling gambling task based on the perceptual decision making paradigm of 
Wyart et al. (2012). Each trial was initiated with the spacebar, after which subjects were 
presented with a ring that had 4 colored dots (orange or blue) on its outside border, each 
90 degrees apart. The dots 180 degrees opposite of each other were always the same 
color. The color of the dots served as a visual landmark for a continuous range of 
monetary values represented by the ring. One color represented the maximum amount of 
money ($20), and the other color represented the minimum amount of money ($0). After 
the ring was presented for a variable interval between 875-1025 milliseconds, eight black 
dots (hereby referred to as elements) were presented serially at a rate of 4 Hz at various 
positions inside the border of the ring. Subjects were instructed that a given element’s 
position in the ring indicated how much money that element was worth (a value that 
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could range between $0-$20). 500 milliseconds after the offset of the eighth element, 
choice options appeared on either side of the fixation cross: a gamble, or a safe bet of $10 
(these appeared as “BET” and $10, respectively). If subjects chose to gamble, they could 
receive the monetary value of one of the eight elements that appeared on that trial, 
selected at random (there was no feedback indicating how much they received if they 
gambled). If they instead chose the safe bet, they could receive $10. Choice was indicated 
using the “z” key to select the left option, and “?/” key to select the right option. Once a 
choice was made, a border appeared around their selection for 250 milliseconds, after 
which would mark the conclusion of the trial (see Figure 4.2 for an example of a trial). 
Critically, no feedback was presented following gambles, as it has been suggested that 
providing feedback for gambles can distort subjects’ overall risk preferences (Stanton et 
al., 2011). At the end of the experiment, one trial was drawn at random, and the monetary 
outcome of that trial (the value of a gamble or a $10 safe bet) was applied to a $20 
endowment given to the subject prior to the study.  
 The orientation of the ring shifted randomly from trial to-trial, decoupling the 
spatial position of the elements from the monetary value they were associated with. The 
value of each elements was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 
$0-$20. The average expected value of the entire stream of elements for a given trial was 
normally distributed around $10. The color of the landmarks demarcating the minimum 
and maximum monetary values on the ring were counterbalanced across subjects. Finally, 
choice options were randomly presented on either the left or the right so that subjects 
could prepare a motor response prior to the presentation of all elements. 
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Electrophysiological Recording, Preprocessing, and Analysis 
 EEG was recorded from a cap with 22 embedded Ag/AgCL electrodes 
specifically designed for EEG recording (Electrocap International) using the 10/20 
system of electrode placement.  Electrode sites included F3, FZ, F4, T3, C3, CZ, C4, T4, 
P3, PZ, P4, P03, P04, P0Z, T5, T6, O1, O2, OL, and OR.  All electrode sites were 
referenced to the left mastoid, and all data was re-referenced off-line to the algebraic 
average of the left and right mastoids.  Horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) were 
recorded from electrodes placed approximately 1 cm to the left and right of the external 
canthi of the eyes of each subject to measure horizontal eye movements. Vertical EOG 
were recorded to detect subject eye blinks from an electrode placed beneath the left eye 
Figure 4.2. Timeline of a trial for the multi-sampling gambling task. 
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and referenced to the left mastoid. Impedances of all channels were kept below 5 kW. 
EEG and EOG signals were amplified with an SA Instrumentation amplifier with a 
bandpass filter of 0.01-80 Hz and were digitized at 250 Hz in LabView 6.1 running on a 
PC. 
 EEG data were preprocessed offline in MATLAB (MathWorks) using the 
EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and custom scripts. For each trial, raw 
EEG was segmented into 4700 millisecond epochs time-locked to the onset of the first 
element (700 milliseconds pre-stimulus, 4000 milliseconds post-stimulus). This large 
window was used to account for edge artifacts (M. X. Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011). A 
smaller -500 milliseconds pre-stimulus to 2350 milliseconds post-stimulus window was 
used for subsequent analyses.  Trials with vertical eye movements in excess of 300 µV 
across a 200 millisecond sliding window, or horizontal eye movements in excess of 35µV 
across a 250 millisecond were excluded from analyses. Estimates of EEG power were 
obtained using the following methods described by Cohen and Cavanagh (2011). First, 
EEG data for each epoch were decomposed into time-frequency representations using a 
fast-Fourier transform. The power spectrum of this time-frequency representation was 
then multiplied with the power spectrum of complex Morelet wavelets with a frequency 
range of 1-25 Hz in 25 logarithmically spaced steps before taking the inverse fast-Fourier 
transform. Power was defined as the average squared amplitude of the resulting complex 
signal, and delta band power was defined as the average power between 1-3 Hz. Reported 
results are based on EEG data averaged across all electrode sites (Wyart et al., 2012).  
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Multivariate Pattern Analysis 
 General method. 
 In order to investigate whether patterns of delta power carries information about 
the manifestation of loss aversion on value representations during the element or stream 
level, we performed a series of multivariate pattern analyses using a naïve Bayes 
algorithm. First, all artifact-free trials were randomly partitioned into three blocks. To 
remove collinear processes (e.g., sensory adaptations), all data points were transformed 
into z-scores to de-mean power differences among electrodes, removing any univariate 
signals. Each block was assigned as a training set, which was used to develop a naïve 
Bayes function to decode the condition label of an independent test set (described in next 
section). We used a hold-one-block-out cross-validation procedure, in which power 
estimates from two of three blocks served as the training set and those from the 
remaining block served as the test set. This process was repeated until each block had 
served as the test set. To improve the signal-to-noise ratio of the analysis, we introduced 
an iterative procedure in which the entire process described above was repeated 35 times 
to obtain the average of results across iterations. Decoding results were averaged across 
both iterations and subjects. 
 Element vs. stream analyses.  
The previously described method was applied slightly differently for element vs. 
stream level analyses. For element level analyses, each epoch of delta power was further 
subdivided into 600 millisecond (150 time samples at 250 Hz) segments time-locked to 
the onset of each of the eight elements. Thus, for this level of analysis, each trial yielded 
eight unique epochs of delta power to use for the decoding analyses (and thus, increased 
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the size of the dataset eightfold). Each element was assigned one of four condition labels 
to be used for decoding. These labels were based on the monetary value of the element, 
and were defined as follows: High loss ($0-$5), low loss ($5-$10), low gain ($10 – $15), 
and high gain ($15 - $20). Critically, gains and losses were defined as being relative to 
the $10 safe bet. Prior to averaging across iterations, the decoding analysis resulted in an 
c × c × t × i matrix of decoding accuracies for each subject. Here c is the number of 
condition labels, t is the number of time samples, i is the number of iterations. After 
averaging across iterations, the result was 150 4x4 confusion matrices, where each cell 
represented the average decoding accuracy (as a percentage) between the expected 
condition label and the label reported by the classifier. For element-level analyses, we 
averaged the time period just before the offset of the element until the end of the element 
epoch (248 – 600 milliseconds). It is important to note that despite using 600 millisecond 
epochs at the element level, where each epoch contains more than one element, it has 
been established using this method that the onset of an additional element does not 
disrupt the encoding of the previous element (Wyart et al., 2012). 
For stream level analyses, each trial’s entire 500 milliseconds pre-stimulus to 
2350 milliseconds post-stimulus epoch (713 time samples at 250 Hz) of delta power was 
assigned one of four condition labels based on the average expected value of the entire 
stream of eight elements. Since the expected value of each stream was normally 
distributed around $10, the tails of this expected value distribution would contain fewer 
observations. To account for this, four bins were created based on average expected 
value, each with an approximately equal number of observations. These bins served as 
the condition labels, and were defined as follows: High loss (M = $5.59), low loss (M = 
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$8.63), low gain (M = $11.47), and high gain (M = $14.41). Again, gains and losses were 
defined as relative to the $10 safe bet. As a first step to determine whether multivariate 
patterns of delta band activity contained any information about expected value, we ran a 
modified version of the decoding analysis described above to produce a t x i matrix 
where t is the number of time samples and i is the number of iterations, that described 
overall decoding accuracy of the four expected value categories. Averaging across 
iterations resulted in a vector of decoding accuracies over time for the entire stream of 
elements. Next, we computed confusion matrices in the same manner described for the 
element level, but instead used the expected value condition labels. For stream-level 
analyses, we averaged the time period just after the offset of the entire stream of elements 
until the end of the stream epoch (2004 – 2350 milliseconds). 
Assessment of neural representations of loss aversion. 
In order to test for neural representations of loss aversion, all confusion matrices 
were first tested for two specific effects: 1) an intermediate categorical effect determining 
whether there is a categorical boundary that separates cells in the matrix defined by gain-
related and loss-related condition labels (relative to the intermediate reference $10 point), 
and 2) an overall continuous effect determining whether there is overall sensitivity to the 
magnitude of the outcome (low or high). The presence or absence of these two effects 
allows us to infer the presence of representations that would be consistent with loss 
aversion. As mentioned before, loss aversion could potentially manifest itself in two 
ways; as a shift in the criterion upon which the boundary for gains and losses is defined 
(shifted categorical), or a selective sensitivity to the magnitude of gains, but not losses 
(selective continuous). Evidence for an intermediate categorical effect rules out the 
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possibility of a shifted categorical effect. Likewise, evidence of an overall continuous 
effect rules out the possibility of a selective continuous effect. In the case of the selective 
continuous effect of loss aversion, in addition to the lack of an overall continuous effect, 
it would also need to be established that there was magnitude effect present for only 
gains. The intermediate categorical effect was defined as the comparison between the 
correctly identified loss and gain categories, and incorrectly identified loss and gain 
categories (i.e. the lower left and upper right quadrants of the upper left and lower right 
quadrants of the confusion matrix; category ON vs category OFF). The overall 
continuous effect was defined as the comparison between the cells along the diagonal and 
those immediately off the diagonal for the quadrants representing correctly identified loss 
and gain information (i.e. lower left and upper right). See Figure 4.3 for a visualization of 
these potential effects. 
 
Results 
Betting Behavior and Response Times are Sensitive to Expected Value of the 
Stream. 
 As a first step, in order to determine whether subjects’ betting behavior was 
sensitive to the expected value of the stream of elements, we predicted trialwise bets for 
Figure 4.3.  Possible representations of value for delta power. 
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each of the four bins of expected value (described previously). Assuming subjects are 
motivated to maximize the amount of money they could earn in this task, we would 
expect for the proportion of bets to increase as a function of the expected value of the 
stream of elements (i.e., the higher the expected value, the more likely the bet). Indeed, 
we found that across increasing ranges of expected value, the proportion of bets increased 
linearly, (b = 4.92), z = 10.26, p < .001 (Figure 4.4A).  In terms of overall betting 
behavior, this sample was relatively risk averse, with an average betting rate of 33%. In 
addition to the linear effect of expected value on betting behavior, there was also a 
quadratic effect of expected value on subject response times, (b = 74.11), z = 3.57, p < 
.01. Response times were overall faster for the lowest and highest ranges of expected 
value, and slower for the intermediate ranges, where the average expected values fell 
closer to the gain/loss boundary (i.e., $10, the value of the safe bet). This suggests that 
choices are likely easier in very low or very high expected value streams, whereas they 
are more difficult as the expected value of the stream approaches the value of the safe bet 
(Figure 4.4B). Overall, these results suggest that subjects are sensitive to the expected 
value of the entire stream of elements, and to some degree are calculating the expected 
value of the stream and making choices accordingly. 
 
Figure 4.4.  A. Betting behavior across different levels of expected value. B. Response 
times across different levels of expected value. 
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Each Element Uniquely Predicts Betting Behavior 
 In addition to the expected value of the stream predicting betting behavior, we 
also wanted to take a more granular approach and determine whether the raw monetary 
value of each of the eight elements predicted trialwise betting behavior. Furthermore, we 
wanted to determine whether there was any systematic over/under weighting of each 
element of value information based upon its serial position within the stream. To test this, 
we constructed a binary logistic hierarchical linear model where we predicted choice by 
the raw monetary value of each of the eight elements (entered into the model as separate 
predictors). Each element significantly predicted whether or not subjects chose to bet (all 
p values < .001), and each element was weighted approximately equally when predicting 
choice, regardless of serial position. This suggests that the position of a given element 
within the stream did not result in systematic over/under weighting while being 
considered for the final choice. Figure 4.5 shows the regression coefficients for each 
element position from this model (a coefficient value of 0 would indicate that a given 
element position was not predictive of choice). 
Valuation at the Element Level Shows No Sign of Loss Aversion 
Hierarchical linear models were constructed in R (R Core Team, 2016) using the 
lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) to assess the presence of the categorical and continuous 
effects described previously at the element level. All analyses took place at the aggregate, 
subject level confusion matrices for the decoding of the condition label for each element. 
Separate models were created to test for both categorical and continuous representations 
of value present in the confusion matrices. Both models specified random intercepts and 
random slopes for their respective factors, and trials (level 1) were nested within subjects 
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(level 2). There was a large intermediate categorical effect, suggesting that delta power 
that 
contains information that differentiates between gain and loss related information for 
each element in the current task, and losses and gains (high and low) are more likely to be 
confused with category labels within the same category, (b = 0.17), t = 6.42, p < .001. 
This finding rules out the possibility of loss aversion manifesting as a shifted categorical 
effect at the element level. There was also no evidence of a difference in decodability 
between gains and losses, suggesting that they were equally represented in the delta band, 
(b = -0.01), t = -1.04, p = ns. Additionally, there was no evidence for an overall 
continuous representation of value at the element level, (b = -0.02), t = -0.78, p = ns. 
Finally, there was no evidence for loss aversion via a selective continuous effect; there 
was no difference in decodability between high and low outcomes between gains and 
losses, (b = 0.01), t = 0.49, p = ns. Overall, at the element level, it appears as though 
Figure 4.5.  Regression coefficients predicting choice for each element position. 
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gains and losses are processed in a strictly intermediate categorical manner, with no 
evidence for loss aversion by either a shift in the categorical boundary, or selective 
representation of magnitude for gains (Figure 4.6A).  
 
Valuation at the Stream Level Shows Some Signs of Loss Aversion  
To first determine whether delta power contained any information that could 
reliably distinguish between average levels of expected value, we computed decoding 
accuracy for the levels of expected value over the course of the trial. Visualization of 
decoding accuracy over time showed that delta power contains information that results in 
above chance (25%) decodability of expected value. As would be expected by an 
expected value signal that would require computing the average value of the stream, 
rather than relying on any single element, above chance decodability began well into the 
trial (approximately 1000 milliseconds after the onset of the stream) and increased as the 
trial progressed, peaking towards the end of the epoch (Figure 4.7). This further 
Figure 4.6.  A. Confusion matrix of classification accuracy at the element level. B. Confusion 
matrix of classification accuracy at the stream level. 
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motivated analyzing the confusion matrices at the stream-level to assess the presence of 
the categorical, continuous, and loss aversion effects discussed previously. 
 
The same methods used for element-level analyses of confusion matrices were 
also used for the stream level confusion matrices. Like at the element-level, there was an 
intermediate category effect, suggesting that delta power contains information that 
differentiates between gain and loss related information for the entire stream of elements  
in the current task, and that losses and gains (high and low) are more likely to be 
confused with category labels within the same category, (b = 0.06), t = 2.72, p < .05. 
Compared to the element level, the size of this category effect was markedly smaller, but 
this finding rules out the possibility of loss aversion manifesting as a shifted categorical 
effect at the stream level. Also like at the element level, there was no evidence of a 
difference in decodability between gains and losses, suggesting that they were equally 
Figure 4.7.  Classification accuracy of expected value across the course of a trial. 
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represented in the delta band, (b = -0.03), t = -1.14, p = ns. There was also no evidence 
for an overall continuous representation of value at the stream level, (b = -0.01), t = -
0.20, p = ns. However, there was evidence for loss aversion; there was a distinction 
between high and low magnitude outcomes specifically for gains, with no such effect for 
losses, (b = 0.07), t = 2.15, p < .05 (Figure 4.6B). This is consistent with a selective 
continuous representation of gains, but not losses, at the stream level. Overall, at the 
stream level, gains and losses appear to be processed as categorically distinct, along with 
some sensitivity to the magnitude of gains, but not losses, a result consistent with loss 
aversion. More specifically, a steeper utility function for losses than that for gains would 
suggest that the losses are represented in a more “all or none” manner, whereas gains may 
be represented with more fine detail with regards to magnitude.   
Discussion 
Humans engage in a wide variety of value-based decisions, but the efficiency in 
which we engage in them is far from optimal. Distortions in valuation such as loss 
aversion lead to preferences that favor making decisions to avoid losses, rather than those 
that result in equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Although Prospect Theory 
has proposed that loss aversion is the product of asymmetric utility functions between 
gains and losses that result in losses having about twice as much more “psychological 
impact” than gains, to date no studies have systematically investigated when these biases 
might occur during valuation. The current work sought to clarify this by implementing a 
novel multi-sampling gambling task that required subjects to process individual elements 
of value information and integrate them in order to optimize decision making. Such a task 
allowed us to investigate whether or not loss aversion occurs at the level of initial 
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valuation, or later integration. In addition, through the use of multivariate pattern 
classification techniques, we were not only able to investigate when loss aversion might 
occur, but also how it might occur. Here, we demonstrated that delta power, a signal 
previously shown to be associated with evidence integration (Wyart et al., 2012) and 
reward (Bernat et al., 2015; Knyazev, 2007; 2012), carries information about 
representations of value in the current task. Specifically, we showed that gains and losses 
are processed as binary and categorically distinct for individual elements of a stream of 
value information, whereas once integrated, the stream-level expected value showed 
magnitude sensitivity for gains, but not losses. This is entirely consistent with a steeper 
utility function for losses relative to that for gains, which is predicted by prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and suggests that distortions in valuation like loss 
aversion may occur farther downstream during the integration of value information.  
The use of a multi-sampling task adapted from Wyart et al. (2012) was critical in 
assessing what stage of valuation loss aversion might occur. Such a method is a departure 
from the overwhelming majority of other value based decision making tasks, where all 
necessary decision-relevant information is presented explicitly upfront (Canessa et al., 
2013; Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2009; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007; Krajbich, Lu, Camerer, & 
Rangel, 2012; Plassmann, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2010; Rangel et al., 2008; Tom et al., 
2007). Such a design makes it difficult to differentiate between any initial valuation 
period and a later integration period. For example, in the case of the presentation of a 
mixed gamble (a commonly used method in studies examining loss aversion; (Canessa et 
al., 2013; Stanton et al., 2011; Tom et al., 2007)) it is unclear not if, but when they are 
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processing the different aspects of information (i.e. probability, magnitude, gain/loss, 
etc.). The multisampling approach is ideal for decoupling initial processing vs. later 
integration since it tightly controls the timing and type of information being presented to 
the subject.  
Choice Behavior Sensitive to Both Element Values and Stream Expected Value 
 Overall, the task used in the current work proved to be effective as indexed by 
subject choice behavior and response times. At the element level, binary logistic 
regression for the raw monetary value of each element showed that they were all uniquely 
predictive of the subjects’ choices to gamble or not, regardless of their serial position 
within the stream. Furthermore, each element was approximately equally predictive at 
each serial position, a result that mirrors those of Wyart et al (2012), whose task the 
current work was adapted from. In additional to the contribution of individual elements 
on behavior, subjects’ decisions to gamble were sensitive to the level of expected value 
of the stream. As the expected value grew larger, betting behavior increased linearly. This 
strongly suggests that subjects could successfully integrate the values of the elements into 
an overall expected value for the stream. Particularly telling is the response time data; 
rather than the different levels of expected value having equivalent response times, 
subjects made choices more quickly when the expected value was either very low or very 
high, when compared to intermediate levels above and below the value of the safe bet. 
This quadratic effect in response times for levels of expected value suggests that very 
high and low levels of expected value were easy to recognize, and produced faster 
responses, whereas intermediate values required more deliberate consideration before 
making choice. This further reinforces that subjects were sensitive to the expected value 
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of the stream, and provides additional justification for the use of multi-sampling tasks 
when wanting to examine the integration of information.  
Delta Power is Informative of Value Representations at Both the Element and 
Stream Level 
 As with previous work, the current work showed that delta power likely carries 
information about underlying representations of value or reward (Bernat et al., 2015; 
Knyazev, 2007; 2012).  At the element level, delta power suggests that value is 
represented in a purely categorical gain/loss manner (relative to the value of a safe bet). 
We found no evidence for loss aversion either through shifting the boundary by which 
gains and losses are defined, or by a selective representation of the magnitude of gains, 
but not losses. Similarly, at the stream level, we found evidence for a categorical 
boundary that separated gain and loss-related levels of expected value. However, there 
was evidence of loss aversion at the stream level; delta power distinguished between high 
and low levels of expected value for gains, but not losses, with no evidence for a 
categorical shift in the gain/loss boundary. This is consistent with asymmetric utility 
functions for gains and losses, whereby the function for losses is markedly steeper than 
that for gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In principle, this would result in selectively 
poorer “resolution” with regards to being able to differentiate between magnitudes of 
losses, and instead treating all losses approximately equally. Meanwhile, the 
comparatively less steep utility function for gains would more likely accommodate for 
differentiation between gains of different magnitudes. Additionally, this result is similar 
to what some have found with the feedback-related negativity (FRN); San Martin et al. 
(2010) found that in addition to categorically distinguishing between gains and losses 
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following feedback during a gambling task, the FRN was also selectively sensitive to the 
magnitude of gains, but not losses.  
Neural Representations of Loss Aversion Occur Following Value Integration 
 The current work helps address two fundamental questions about the nature of 
valuation distortions such as loss aversion: 1) At what stage of processing do they occur? 
And, 2) How are they represented through underlying neural signals? The evidence 
provided here suggests that value distortions like loss aversion occur during later stages 
of processing following integration of value evidence, rather than during initial valuation. 
Furthermore, through the use of multivariate decoding techniques (Haxby et al., 2001; 
Kriegeskorte, 2008; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006), 
that can map the representational space of underlying neural signals, the current work 
suggests that loss aversion is the result of a shift from a categorical representation of 
gains and losses during the initial stage of processing to a selectively continuous 
representation of the magnitude of gains, but not losses, following integration of 
information. Although the current work helps clarify when and how loss aversion may 
occur, it does not address why this might happen. For example, it may be inefficient for a 
system that monitors the value of items in the environment to place heavy biases on the 
representations of value for those items during initial valuation. Compared to a more 
unbiased assessment of the true value of items (or category of items, as observed for 
value representations at the element levels), biasing their representations of value during 
early stages of processing might result in a decision variable that is too skewed to 
facilitate optimal choice. This however, would need to be investigated more directly.   
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the design of the current work offered a novel opportunity to investigate 
when and how loss aversion might manifest, it is not without its limitations. For example, 
average betting rates for this sample were approximately 33%. This suggests, to some 
degree, that individuals were loss averse overall and were biased to play it safe unless the 
expected value was very high. Even when the expected value of the stream was higher 
than the value of the safe bet, but not drastically so (low gain condition), betting rates 
were fairly low (~38%). This same range of expected value also produced the longest 
response times. Although outwardly these behaviors seem consistent with a loss verse 
attitude, it is difficult to disentangle an effect due to true loss aversion and one simply 
due to task difficulty. The current task presented stimuli at a rapid rate and thus 
demanded a great deal of attention to optimally perform. It is possible that the overall low 
betting rates were also due to the task being difficult, and subjects simply relying on a 
more conservative strategy rather than truly experiencing loss aversion. However, the 
choice and response time patterns indicate that they were able to track the expected value 
of the stream. It is indeed possible to make this task less demanding (i.e. fewer elements 
and slower presentation rate), but that would to be carefully balanced because the current 
experimental session was already approximately three hours.  
With regards to the use of a multi-sampling gambling task, an open question that 
remains is exactly how much evidence needs to be integrated before loss aversion begins 
to manifest itself at the neural level. This question is motivated by the fact that reliable 
decodability of the expected value of the stream started approximately 1000 milliseconds 
into a trial (approximately halfway through). This suggests that it may not be necessary to 
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integrate all information before a reliable decision variable is computed, and leaves open 
the question as to whether or not differing levels of integrated evidence produce differing 
levels of valuation distortions. Are underlying value representations differentially 
susceptible to valuation distortions based upon how much evidence has been integrated?   
Conclusions 
The current work used a novel multi-sampling gambling task in conjunction with 
multivariate pattern classification methods to investigate when and how distortions in 
valuation such as loss aversion might manifest. Delta power seemed to carry information 
about representations of value at both the individual element and aggregate stream level. 
Patterns of delta power visualized through confusion matrices revealed that losses and 
gains are represented in a purely categorical manner with no sensitivity to their 
magnitude at the individual element level. In contrast, at the aggregate stream level, delta 
power showed sensitivity for the magnitude of gains, but not losses, consistent with 
asymmetric utility functions predicted by Prospect Theory. This marks the first attempt to 
systematically classify when and how loss aversion might occur, and motivates the use of 
multi-sampling and pattern classification approaches to investigate a broader range of 
topics where distinguishing between different levels of processing is required. 
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CHAPTER V 
WHAT ARE THE DYNAMICS OF PROCESSING INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC 
VALUE INFORMATION? 
 Study two demonstrated that information about losses and gains was processed 
independently at the element level, with a sharp categorical boundary separating the two. 
Subjects were able to track this information, and integrate it into an expected value 
signal, as evidenced by both their betting behavior and through robust representations of 
ranges of expected value in multivariate patterns of delta power. Evidence for the 
representation of such an integrated signal began to appear after approximately 1000 
milliseconds into the trail. However, the information being integrated form the elements 
was information that was intrinsic to the elements themselves. In many cases, value can 
be derived from characteristics that are extrinsic to the item (e.g. the cost of effort 
associated with obtaining the item). Are intrinsic and extrinsic categories of value 
information integrated along a similar timecourse? Are these two types of information 
processed in a parallel or serial manner? These questions, among others were explored in 
study 3. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FIXATIONS REVEAL SERIAL PROCESSING OF VALUE AND EFFORT DURING 
VALUE GUIDED CHOICE 
Introduction 
 With regards to making value based decisions, a large body of work has suggested 
that the brain assigns a value to all options under consideration to allow for effective 
comparison, and ultimately, an advantageous choice (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; 
Rangel et al., 2008). In most instances, in order to effectively extract value information 
from a set of items under consideration, one needs to sample information from the items 
via visual fixations. Indeed, a growing body of literature has examined how overt fixation 
behavior contributes to information accumulation during value based decisions. This 
work has demonstrated that eye movements and the value of items interact reciprocally; 
eye movements both affect the assignment of value to items, and the value we assign to 
items is affected by eye movements. For example, valued items may be looked at more 
frequently (Krajbich et al., 2010; 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal, Mormann, & 
Koch, 2013), but the time we spend looking at an item can also increase its perceived 
value (Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Lim, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2011; Towal et al., 
2013).  
 Value is often associated with the intrinsic characteristics of the item itself (i.e. 
taste, appearance, etc.). However, value can also be affected by characteristics that are 
extrinsic to the item itself; for example, the cost or effort associated with attaining the 
item (Rangel & Hare, 2010). Often, extrinsic information can be known before the object 
itself comes into focus and therefore can set the context of the item-specific valuation 
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process in a top-down manner. For example, a scenic view of Half Dome might be a 
highly valued experience, but comes at the cost of having to be reached via a difficult 
hike. Additionally, consider a situation where a hungry diner sees the prices for menu 
items at a well-reviewed, but expensive, restaurant. In each of these scenarios, value can 
be construed as the absolute difference between these intrinsic and extrinsic 
characteristics (Rangel & Hare, 2010). 
The comparison between intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics has been examined 
in the case of multi-attribute decision making (ex. taste vs. health (Hare, Malmaud, & 
Rangel, 2011), taste vs. physical effort (Harris & Lim, 2016), monetary reward vs. 
physical effort (Klein-Flugge, Kennerley, Friston, & Bestmann, 2016), erotic images vs. 
physical and mental effort (Prévost, Pessiglione, Météreau, Cléry-Melin, & Dreher, 
2010)). However, it has not been examined how intrinsic and extrinsic factors interact as 
we accumulate decision-relevant information during the valuation process.  Specifically, 
we were interested in how the pre-cuing of extrinsic effort affects fixation and valuation 
behavior, and to what degree extrinsic and intrinsic information are integrated in a 
continuous and parallel manner, or whether we process these different types of 
information within distinct, serial stages.   
To lay out our questions and competing alternative hypotheses in greater detail, it 
is useful to first present our paradigm. In the present study we recorded eye movements 
from subjects as they engaged in a decision making task where they first rated a series of 
snack food items, and then had to choose among pairs of items that could ultimately be 
chosen for them to keep. This task was largely based on previous work using similar 
paradigms to investigate the role that overt visual behavior has on valuation during 
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decision making (Armel et al., 2008; Krajbich et al., 2010; 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 
2011). However, the key difference is that we included an effort manipulation in the form 
of math problems that would need to be solved in order to choose particular items. In half 
the trials, subjects were presented with a pre-cue prior to the onset of the to-be-decided-
upon items that associated one of the items with needing to solve a math problem in order 
to choose it (more specific detail about the task can be found in the methods section). 
This departure from previous designs allows us to more directly assess how value and 
effort are processed as indexed through visual behavior.  
More specifically, this design allows us to address several questions. First, how 
does foreknowledge of effort affect first fixations? Based on the notion that higher-valued 
objects draw attention (Krajbich et al., 2010; 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal et 
al., 2013) one might expect that adding effort to an object in an a-priori manner would 
drive fixations away from that object. Alternatively, we also need to consider the 
possibility that assigning effort to one of the two potential locations with a fully 
predictive pre-cue makes this location “stand out” and attracts fixations to it.  
Furthermore, how is information about value and effort integrated? Are these two 
types of information integrated in a parallel or serial manner? If these two types of 
information were integrated in a parallel manner, we might expect that the initial fixation 
is, if anything, influenced only by the effort pre-cue. However, remaining fixations 
should be determined by an interaction of both value and effort—specifically, where the 
objects with highest conflict (no effort/low value or high effort/high value) attract the 
largest proportion of fixations. If information about value and effort was instead 
processed in a serial manner, similarly, we might expect that the initial fixation is 
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influenced only by the effort pre-cue. In a second phase, fixations should also start to 
reflect value, but in a manner that is additive with effort, followed by a third phase during 
which the two interact. Additionally, it would be important to determine the utility of 
how information integration (as assessed through fixation behavior) contributes to actual 
choice behavior. A schematic representation of these parallel and serial information 
processing hypotheses can be found in Figure 6.1. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
 A total of 40 subjects (19 male) were recruited in return for course credit or a 
monetary compensation of $30 in addition to one food item. All subjects had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and gave written informed consent according to procedures 
approved by the University of Oregon Institutional Review Board.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. A schematic representation of parallel (top) and serial (bottom) processing of 
intrinsic (value) and extrinsic (effort) information. 
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Experimental Task and Stimuli 
All subjects were asked to refrain from eating in the two hours prior to the 
experimental session. The experiment was largely based on previous work examining 
both decision making and eye tracking (Armel et al., 2008; Krajbich et al., 2010; 2012; 
Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Polanía, Krajbich, Grueschow, & Ruff, 2014; Polanía, Moisa, 
Opitz, Grueschow, & Ruff, 2015), and took place in three major phases: an initial 
slideshow, a ratings phase, and a decision phase. The primary stimuli for the task 
consisted of a set of images of 88 unique snack foods (chips, candy bars, fruits, nuts, 
etc.). Each image consisted of a single food item against a black background. Stimuli for 
the task were presented at a size of 300 x 300 pixels in Matlab using the Psychophysics 
toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997).  
 Slideshow. 
 Subjects first progressed through a slideshow of images of the 88 unique food 
items. Each item was presented for at least one second, after which subjects could 
advance the slideshow at their own pace by pressing the spacebar on the keyboard. The 
purpose of the slideshow was to familiarize subjects with the variety of foods available 
(they were also shown the actual inventory of these foods stored in the lab). Subjects 
were explicitly aware that they would be rating each of these items later in the task, but 
they were not informed of what criteria the items would be rated on. Items were 
presented in a random order for each subject.  
 Ratings. 
 Following the slideshow, subjects were required to rate each individual item 
based on how interested they would be in eating the item after the study. Items were rated 
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on a 20-point scale ranging from 1 (“I am not at all interested in eating this item”) to 20 
(“I am incredibly interested in eating this item”). Like the slideshow, items were 
presented in a random order and subjects were required to move an on-screen slider to the 
rating that best described how they felt about the current item on screen using the left and 
right arrow keys. Ratings were confirmed by pressing the spacebar, at which point 
subjects would be presented with the next item. The initial starting point of the slider was 
randomized on each trial to prevent anchoring effects (Krajbich et al., 2010), and subjects 
were encouraged to rate each item as specifically as possible. 
 Decision task. 
 During the decision task, subjects were required to choose among pairs of items; 
each item that was chosen had a chance of being selected for the subject to take home at 
the conclusion of the experiment via a lottery. In order to generate trials for the decision 
task, subjects’ ratings from the ratings phase served as the input to an algorithm that 
found all unique pairs of the 88 items and assigned them to one of four value bins based 
on whether the highest rated item – lowest rated item = [1, 2, 3, 4] (Polanía et al., 2014; 
2015). 88 unique pairs were randomly selected from each bin to serve the trials for the 
decision task. In the event that the algorithm could not generate the required number of 
trials, the bin widths were doubled (this only occurred with two subjects). All subjects 
completed 352 trials of the decision task (16 blocks of 22 trials).  
 At the beginning of each trial, subjects were presented with two empty square 
frames (one presented on the left side of the screen, one presented on the right side of the 
screen) for 1000 ms. The color of the frames (orange or blue) served as a pre-cue that 
informed the subjects whether or not the item that would appear inside that frame for that 
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trial would be associated with an additional math task (described in a later section). Half 
of the trials in each value bin were associated with math, and the colors to denote math 
vs. no-math items were counterbalanced across subjects. After the presentation of the 
empty frames, subjects were required to maintain uninterrupted fixation on a central 
fixation cross for 1000 ms. Following a successful 1000 ms of continuous fixation, the 
food items for that trial appeared simultaneously inside the frames. Once the items were 
presented, subjects were free to examine them and choose which item they wanted to be 
included in the lottery using the left and right arrow keys. There were no time constraints 
during the choice period, and trials were separated by a 500 millisecond intertrial 
interval. A basic outline of the decision portion of a trial can be seen in Figure 6.2A. 
 Math task. 
 At the end of the trial, if subjects had chosen an item that required them to 
complete the additional math task according to the pre-cue, an equation would be 
presented above the central fixation cross that needed to be solved in order for the 
experiment to progress. Equations consisted of seven unique numbers between one and 
nine, with addition and subtraction between them. Subjects were required to provide the 
solution to the addition and subtraction of these seven numbers using the numeric keypad 
on the right side of the keyboard, and submitting the answer using the enter key. If an 
incorrect answer was provided, feedback was provided in the form of the words “Invalid 
Response” printed in red under the equation for 1000 ms. If the correct answer was 
provided, the word “Correct” was printed in green under the equation. The solution to 
each equation always ranged between one and nine, although intermediary values while 
solving the equations could fall outside these bounds (subjects were explicitly aware of 
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this). There were no time constrains during the math trials, and subjects had as many 
attempts as necessary to provide the correct answer. An example of the math portion of a 
math trial if they chose the item associated with math can be seen in Figure 6.2B. 
 
Eye tracking. 
 Subjects were seated with their chin stabilized by a chin rest with their eyes 
approximately 50 cm from the monitor. A 17-inch CRT monitor set to 1024 × 768 
resolution was used for stimulus presentation. Eye movements were measured using the 
SR Research desk-mounted Eyelink 1000, controlled by the Eyelink Toolbox in 
MATLAB (Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002) at a rate of 1000 Hz. Fixations were 
Figure 6.2. A. Example of a trial of the decision task (this trial contains a pre-cue for 
math). B. Example of the math task. 
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recorded when neither a blink nor a saccade was present, and saccades were defined for 
each pair of successive data samples for which the velocity of eyes exceeded 30°/s or the 
acceleration surpassed 8,000 °/s2. Eye movements were recorded during the decision task 
only. 
Calculating Fixation Probabilities to Targets Across Time. 
 In order to investigate the temporal dynamics of fixation behavior, we computed 
the probability of fixations to various targets during the decision task across the duration 
of each trial. This was accomplished by first specifying a target during the decision task 
(i.e. preferred item vs. non-preferred item, item associated with math vs. item not 
associated with math, item on the right vs. item on the left, etc.) and extracting a 2000 
millisecond epoch of data following the onset of the target for each trial. Epochs were 
downsampled to 40 Hz (81 timepoints) and from these we could extract whether subjects 
were fixating on the target separately for each timepoint. These data were later averaged 
across various time windows for specific analyses (described later). 
Results 
Response Time and Choice Consistency Effects 
 All reported analyses were carried out by constructing hierarchical linear models 
in R (R Core Team, 2016) using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015). All models 
specified a random intercept for each subject. We first constructed a model to see if the 
difference in value between items under consideration (i.e. choice difficulty) and the 
presence of math were predictive of trialwise response times. For the factor associated 
with the presence of math, we constructed two non-orthogonal contrasts comparing 1) no 
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math vs. math on the preferred item, and 2) math on the non-preferred item vs. math on 
the preferred item. Overall, there was a linear decrease in response times as the difference 
in value between the two items increased (i.e. as the choice became easier) (b = -114.87), 
t = -4.00, p < .001. On average, response times on trials with no math (M = 2311.90, SE 
= 17.42) were significantly lower when compared to those where math was associated 
with preferred item (M = 2510.56, SE = 32.40) (b = -190.72), t = -5.71, p < .001. 
Similarly, response times on trials where math was associated with the non-preferred 
item (M = 2304.74, SE = 27.73) were significantly lower than when math was associated 
with the preferred item, (b = -194.08), t = -5.02, p < .001 (Figure 6.3A). 
 
 In addition to response time, we also constructed a model to see if the difference 
in value between items under consideration and the presence of math were predictive of 
trialwise selection of the preferred item. Here, the preferred item was defined as the item 
that was received the higher rating during the previous rating task. For the factor 
associated with the presence of math, we constructed two non-orthogonal contrasts 
Figure 6.3. A. Response times as a function of the difference in value between items across 
each math condition. B.  Choice consistency as a function of the difference in value between 
items across each math condition. 
 64 
 
comparing 1) no math vs. math on the preferred item, and 2) no math vs. math on the 
non-preferred item. Overall, there was a linear increase in tendency to choose the 
preferred item as the difference in value between the two items increased (b = 0.57), z = 
8.87, p < .001. The presence of math on the preferred item decreased choice of the 
preferred item (M =0.52, SE = 0.02) compared to the no math condition (M = 0.71, SE = 
0.008), (b = 0.82), z = -5.78, p < .001. Conversely, the presence of math on the non-
preferred item increased choice of the preferred item (M = 0.82, SE = 0.01) compared to 
the no math condition, (b = 0.80), z = 6.70, p < .001 (Figure 6.3B).  
Basic Properties of the Visual Search 
As a first step in examining the properties of the visual search, we tested to see 
whether first fixations were drawn to the preferred item, in addition to how first fixations 
were influenced by the presence of math. For the factor associated with the presence of 
math, we constructed two non-orthogonal contrasts comparing 1) no math vs. math on the 
preferred item, and 2) no math vs. math on the non-preferred item. Here, first fixations 
were significantly more likely to land on the preferred item when math was associated 
with the preferred item (M = 0.57, SE = 0.02), compared to the no math condition, (M = 
0.50, SE = 0.007) (b = 0.30), z = 7.29, p < .001. Conversely, first fixations were 
significantly less likely to land on the preferred item when math was associated with the 
non-preferred item (M = 0.56, SE = 0.02), compared to the no math condition, (b = -
0.27), z = -6.50, p < .001. It is important to note that the probability of fixations to 
preferred/non-preferred items are inversely related to one another, since subjects only 
have two targets to fixate on. Overall there is no evidence to indicate that first fixations 
are drawn by the value of the item; rather, the presence of math (which is known in 
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advance by the subject) seems to draw first fixations (Figure 6.4). Furthermore, there was 
no evidence for any systematic bias for first fixations to go to the left or right item.  
Importantly, we also examined what effect item preference (preferred vs. non-
preferred) and presence of math had on total dwell time to items during the decision task. 
For the factor associated with the presence of math, we constructed two non-orthogonal 
contrasts comparing 1) no math vs. math on the preferred item, and 2) math on the non-
preferred item vs. math on the preferred item. Overall, subjects dwelled longer on the 
preferred item (M = 767.01, SE = 6.50) compared to the non-preferred item (M = 718.83, 
SE = 7.09), (b = 49.52), t = 5.78, p < .001. Subjects also looked longer at a given item 
when math was associated with the preferred item (M = 789.00, SE = 7.12), compared to 
the no math condition, (M = 715.16, SE = 7.12) (b = 81.54), t = 5.80, p < .001. The same 
pattern was true comparing dwell times between the preferred item and non-preferred 
item (M = 724.59, SE = 9.43), (b = 89.68), t = 5.49, p < .001 (Figure 6.5A). 
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Figure 6.4. Fixation probabilities to preferred and non-preferred items for each math 
condition.  
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Finally, we examined whether or not fixating back and forth between items 
differed as a function of the presence of math, and the difference in value between the 
items. For this analysis, we computed the number of unique back and forth fixations 
between items per trial; consecutive fixations to the same item did not count towards this. 
We first constructed a model to see if the difference in value between items under 
consideration (i.e. choice difficulty) and the presence of math were predictive of trialwise 
back and forth fixations. For the factor associated with the presence of math, we 
constructed two non-orthogonal contrasts comparing 1) no math vs. math on the preferred 
item, and 2) math on the non-preferred item vs. math on the preferred item. Overall, there 
was a linear decrease in back and forth fixations as the difference in value between the 
two items increased (i.e. as the choice became easier) (b = -.11), t = -5.22, p < .001. On 
average, there were fewer back and forth fixations on trials with no math (M = 2.85, SE 
= 0.01) when compared to trials where math was associated with preferred item (M = 
2.92, SE = 0.02) (b = -0.07), t = -2.60, p < .01. This difference in back and forth fixations 
between these two conditions increased as a function of the difference in value between 
the items under consideration, (b = -0.16), t = -3.14, p < .01. Similarly, there were fewer 
back and forth fixations on trials where math was associated with the non-preferred item 
(M = 2.75, SE = 0.02) compared to trials where math was associated with the preferred 
item, (b = -0.17), t = -5.78, p < .001. Again, this difference in back and forth fixations 
between these two conditions increased as a function of the difference in value between 
the items under consideration, (b = -0.18), t = -3.11, p < .01.  These effects are illustrated 
in Figure 6.5B.  
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Fixation Behavior Over Time Shows Prioritization of Different Item 
Characteristics. 
In order to more closely examine the dynamics of fixation behavior, we calculated 
fixation probabilities to various targets across time over the course of a trial following the 
onset of the items (described in methods). For simplicity, only 4 conditions were used for 
analyses: fixations to the preferred item when math was associated with the preferred 
item, fixations to the non-preferred item when math was associated with the non-
preferred item, fixations to the preferred item in the no math condition, and fixations to 
the non-preferred item in the no math condition. This effectively reduced the factor 
structure to 2 (preferred/non-preferred) x 2 (math/no math), which makes it easier to 
interpret effects purely due to item preference or the presence of math. The excluded 
conditions (fixations to the preferred item when math is on the non-preferred item, and 
fixations to the non-preferred item when math is on the preferred item) are perfectly 
complimentary to the two included math conditions, and are thus redundant for further 
Figure 6.5. A. Dwell times to preferred and non-preferred targets for each math condition. B. 
Number of back and forth fixations as a function of the difference in value of choices for each 
math condition. 
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analysis. Additionally, for ease of interpretation, we binarized fixation probabilities to 
convert them to a binary hit/no hit factor for a given target. Time courses of the fixation 
probabilities for these four conditions can be seen in Figure 6.6. Based on visual 
inspection of the fixation probabilities across time, we identified three time windows (in 
ms) of interest for subsequent analyses: an early time window (300 – 500), a middle time 
window (800 - 1300), and a late time window (1500 – 2000). 
 
For the early time window (300 – 500 ms), fixations were significantly more 
likely to be drawn to an item associated with math (M = 0.58, SE = 0.006), regardless of 
item preference, compared to an item in the no math condition (M = 0.51, SE = 0.004), 
(b = 0.31), z = 3.77, p < .001. In contrast, during the middle time window (800 – 1300 
ms), fixations were significantly less likely to be drawn to an item associated with math 
(M = 0.63, SE = 0.005), regardless of item preference, compared to an item in the no 
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Figure 6.6. Timecourses of fixation probabilities to preferred and non-preferred targets in math 
and no math conditions. 
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math condition (M = 0.71, SE = 0.003), (b = -0.29), z = -4.27, p < .0001. Additionally, 
fixations were significantly more likely to be drawn to a preferred item (M = 0.71, SE = 
0.004), regardless of the presence of math, compared to a non-preferred item (M = 0.66, 
SE = 0.004), (b = 0.26), z = 5.82, p < .0001. Similar patterns were found for the late time 
window (1500 – 2000 ms). Again, fixations were significantly less likely to be drawn to 
an item associated with math (M = 0.46, SE = 0.006), regardless of item preference, 
compared to an item in the no math condition (M = 0.49, SE = 0.004), (b = -0.23), z = -
4.29, p < .001. Similarly, fixations were significantly more likely to be drawn to a 
preferred item (M = 0.51, SE = 0.005), regardless of the presence of math, compared to a 
non-preferred item (M = 0.44, SE = 0.005), (b = 0.25), z = 5.79, p < .001. Finally, there 
was a significant interaction that indicated that overall, late period fixations only show a 
math-related aversion for non-preferred items; there was no difference in the likelihood 
of late fixations landing on a preferred item associated with math, and a preferred item in 
the no math condition, (b = 0.19), t = 2.94, p < .01. This suggests some degree of conflict 
between preference and math-related effort for later fixations. Overall, this pattern is 
consistent with the serial, rather than parallel processing of effort and value, with both 
types of information being integrated in the late stages of visual search. An overview of 
these patterns is displayed in Figure 6.7.  
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Late Stage Integration of Effort and Value Information Predicts Choice Behavior. 
 The previous patterns of fixation behavior suggest that information about effort 
and value is processed over time in a serial manner, and the two types of information are 
ultimately integrated in late stages prior to choice. If these patterns of fixation behavior 
actually represent underlying valuation processes, it would stand to reason that they 
would predict choice behavior. To examine this, we constructed a binary logistic 
hierarchical linear model predicting trialwise choice of the item on the right using the 
following predictors: the presence of math on the left (contrasted with the no math 
condition), the presence of math on the right (contrasted with the no math condition), the 
total value advantage of the item on the right, as well as the binarized occurrence of a 
fixation landing on the item on the right during the each of the previously described early, 
middle, and late time windows (these values were never interacted with each other). The 
specific result that would further support the previous finding that late fixations integrate 
information about effort and value would be a significant three-way interaction between 
the presence of math on the right item, the value of the right item, and late fixations 
landing on the right item. It should be noted that the presence of this result is all that 
would be required to further support the serial integration of effort and value information 
Figure 6.7. Fixation probabilities to preferred and non-preferred targets in the math and 
no math conditions across early, middle, and late time windows. 
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during later fixations; the basic prediction is agnostic to the direction of the effect. The 
main goal is to demonstrate that different types of information simultaneously (i.e. in an 
integrated manner) contribute to choice behavior. 
 The full output of this binary logistic hierarchical linear model is displayed in 
Table 1. Consistent with the previously reported effects on choice consistency, the main 
effects for the presence of math contributed to overall choice of the right item; math on 
the left increased the likelihood of choosing the right item, whereas math on the right 
decreased it. Unsurprisingly, there was also a main effect of the value advantage of the 
item on the right, suggesting that the greater the value advantage of the item on the right, 
the greater the likelihood of choosing it. Furthermore, fixating on the right item during 
each of the three time periods (early, middle, late) independently predicted choice of the 
right item. Importantly, it should be noted that the effects for each of these time periods 
were still significant (and in the same direction) when included individually in a reduced 
model. Table 1 shows that there were largely no significant two-way interactions between 
any of the predictors. The only two-way interaction that reached significance was an 
interaction between the value advantage of the item on the right and fixating on the item 
on the right during the early time period. This suggests to some degree early 
representation of value information, which was not captured in the previous models of 
fixation behavior. The only significant three-way interaction was the predicted interaction 
between the presence of math on the right, the value advantage of the item on the right, 
fixating on the item on the right during the late time period. This lends further support to 
the idea that information about effort and value is integrated in during a later period (as  
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Table 1   
Results of Binary Logistic Hierarchical Linear Model Predicting Choice of Item on the Right 
 Variable   Estimate std. Error z p 
(Intercept)   -0.95 0.07 -12.81 <.001 
mathLeft   0.65 0.16 3.99 <.001 
mathRight   -0.75 0.17 -4.51 <.001 
rightVal_adv   0.28 0.03 10.83 <.001 
early_fix   0.37 0.06 6.63 <.001 
middle_fix   0.53 0.06 8.67 <.001 
late_fix   0.80 0.05 16.15 <.001 
mathLeft: rightVal_adv   -0.02 0.06 -0.33 .744 
mathRight: rightVal_adv   0.08 0.06 1.36 .174 
mathLeft: early_fix   0.03 0.13 0.23 .816 
mathRight: early_fix   0.20 0.13 1.59 .112 
mathLeft: middle_fix   -0.22 0.14 -1.53 .127 
mathRight: middle_fix   0.09 0.14 0.68 .494 
mathLeft: late_fix   0.21 0.11 1.91 .056 
mathRight: late_fix   0.04 0.11 0.37 .711 
rightVal_adv: early_fix   0.06 0.02 2.73 .006 
rightVal_adv: middle_fix   0.01 0.02 0.33 .744 
rightVal_adv: late_fix   -0.02 0.02 -1.12 .262 
mathLeft: rightVal_adv: early_fix   -0.03 0.05 -0.60 .546 
mathRight: rightVal_adv: early_fix   -0.03 0.05 -0.54 .590 
mathLeft: rightVal_adv: middle_fix   0.02 0.05 0.42 .675 
mathRight: rightVal_adv: middle_fix   -0.04 0.05 -0.85 .394 
mathLeft: rightVal_adv: late_fix   -0.01 0.04 -0.31 .754 
mathRight: rightVal_adv: late_fix   -0.09 0.04 -2.09 .037 
Note. mathLeft/Right refers to non-orthogonal contrasts comparing the presence of math on the left/right relative to 
the no math condition. rightVal_adv is value if the item on the left subtracted from the value of the item on the right. 
early/middle/late_fix refers to whether a fixation landed on the item on the right during those time windows. 
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indexed by fixation behavior), and the integration of this information meaningfully 
contributes to actual choice behavior. 
Discussion 
 In order to make effective value based decisions, it is often required that we 
extract value information from a set of items under consideration via visual fixations. 
Indeed, fixation behavior has been demonstrated to drive information accumulation 
during value based decisions across a variety of studies (Krajbich et al., 2010; 2012; 
Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Lim et al., 2011). Often times, decision-relevant information 
can reflect either immediate, intrinsic characteristics of the items under consideration (i.e. 
taste, appearance, etc.), or extrinsic characteristics such as the cost or effort required to 
attain the items. It remains an open question whether decision-relevant information from 
intrinsic and extrinsic sources are processed in a similar manner. More specifically, it is 
unclear whether or not these types of information are processed in a continuous, parallel 
manner, or in distinct serial stages. The current work sought to address these questions by 
recording the eye movements of subjects while they performed a value based decision 
making task where in half of the trials, subjects were presented with a pre-cue that 
indicated the presence of an effortful math task that would be associated with one of the 
upcoming to-be-decided-upon items. This design, coupled with eye tracking, allowed us 
to investigate how (if at all) information about effort and value is accumulated over time, 
and whether the processing of this information is ultimately predictive of choice. Overall, 
the current work found several lines of evidence to suggest that effort and value 
information are initially processed in a serial manner before later integration, as assessed 
though fixation behavior. Furthermore, this same index of late information integration 
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was also predictive of actual choice behavior, suggesting that it may reflect an underlying 
decision-relevant signal. 
Information About Effort and Value is Reflected in Basic Behavior and Visual 
Search 
 As with previous studies that have utilized similar decision making tasks, the 
current work found that both response times and choice consistency (i.e., the degree to 
which subjects consistently select items that they had previously indicated as preferred) 
were affected by the difference in value between the two items under consideration. 
Overall, larger differences in value between the two items resulted in faster response 
times and the more consistent choices. These results are largely in line with previous 
studies, and the current work overall had comparable levels of choice consistency 
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). However, unlike previous studies, the 
current work included an effort manipulation in half the trials in the form of a challenging 
math task that was associated with one of the items. The presence of math associated with 
either of the items had potent effects on behavior; math simultaneously inhibited and 
enhances choice consistency when math was associated with the preferred and non-
preferred items, respectively (relative to the no math condition). Additionally, response 
times when math was on the preferred item did not show the same decreasing linear trend 
as the difference in value between the two items increased, suggesting that effort and 
value may interact. However, these results don’t specifically speak to how and when the 
two types of information may interact.  
 In addition to response times and choice consistency, basic properties of visual 
search in this task seem to reflect both effort and value. In line with previous work, first 
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fixations were not intrinsically drawn to the more valued item (Krajbich et al., 2010; 
2012); instead, they were drawn to the item associated with the math. It is likely that this 
was not simply due to a visual capture effect, or something akin to value-based 
attentional capture (B. A. Anderson, 2013), since the onset of the effort pre-cue did not 
occur suddenly and simultaneously with the onset of the items for a given trial. In math 
trials, the pre-cue was always on screen for at least two seconds (1000 ms pre-cue alone, 
1000 ms enforced fixation with pre-cue still present), and thus should not have 
contributed to salient attentional capture effects. Instead, it is likely that first fixations 
were drawn to the item associated with math as part of a general strategy that prioritized 
determining whether the item associated with math was worth the effort, and suggests 
that foreknowledge of effort may be a powerful draw of attention. Importantly, in the no 
math condition, first fixations were random, and landed on the preferred and non-
preferred items with equal frequency. Although first fixations were initially drawn to 
items associated with math, subjects overall looked longer more valuable items. 
Additionally, the back-and-forth fixation patterns between items decreased as a function 
of the difference in value between items, but only for the no math condition, or when 
math was associated with the non-preferred item. The overall equivalent degree of back-
and-forth fixations across differences in value between the two items suggests a degree of 
conflict in trying to resolve effort with value by repeatedly assessing the preferred, but 
effortful item, and the non-preferred, but easily attainable item. Again, this suggests 
integration of effort and value, but these aggregate values are uninformative as to when 
integration may occur.   
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Fixation Behavior Supports Serial Integration of Effort and Value Information and 
Likely Reflects Underlying Decision-Relevant Signals 
 Overall, fixation behavior over the course of a trial support the hypothesis that 
information about effort and value is initially processed in a serial, additive manner, 
before being integrated to reflect the conflict the two. In the early phase of a trial, 
fixations are biased to the items associated with math, with no consideration for value 
(consistent with the reported first fixation data). Middle fixations begin to show 
sensitivity to value in an additive manner; a main effect for value during middle fixations 
indicated that more valued items are more likely to be looked at, while a main effect for 
the presence of math indicated that items associated with math are less likely to be looked 
at. Importantly, there was no interaction between the value and presence of math factors 
during middle fixations, which suggests that they were still being processed serially 
during this phase. Finally, late fixations seem to reflect the integration of information 
about effort and value, as reflected by a significant interaction between the presence of 
math and value which suggests that fixation behavior reflects the degree of conflict 
between two oppositional sources of information. Critically, this integration stage is 
predictive of subsequent choice behavior, which supports the idea that this integration 
reflects a decision-relevant value signal. This pattern of results indicates that the relative 
weighting of different types of information fluctuates over time. Here, we see evidence 
for an initial prioritization of extrinsic information (effort), followed by a prioritization of 
intrinsic information (value), and finally ending with both extrinsic and intrinsic 
information being considered simultaneously. Initial sampling seems to consider these 
sources of information independently, and the later integration of these sources of 
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information may be indicative of the time required to normalize them to a common scale 
for effective comparison, and subsequently, choice (Chib et al., 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 
2012). Overall, the current work supports the hypothesis that extrinsic and intrinsic 
information are initially processed in a serial, rather than parallel manner.  
 Some previous work has attempted to investigate the temporal dynamics of 
extrinsic and intrinsic information during value base decision making. Harris and Lim 
(2016) employed a decision making task where subjects had to decide to expend physical 
effort to potentially receive snack foods while recording EEG. Their results are largely in 
line with the current work; they found that effort information was represented relatively 
early on following stimulus onset, whereas the integrated effort-value information was 
represented later on in the trial, prior to response. However, their study did not directly 
use that integrated signal to predict choice; rather, they traced the signals to sensorimotor 
areas, which are ultimately responsible for generating a response. The current work 
improves upon this by actually demonstrating that this later integrated signal contributes 
to choice behavior within the context of the task.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although the current work demonstrated that extrinsic information about effort is 
prioritized and processed early, the design of the current task may have artificially 
induced this strategy by presenting information about effort prior to the presentation of 
the to-be-decided upon items. However, Harris and Lim (2016) presented information 
about effort and value simultaneously, and found evidence for early processing of effort 
(as opposed to value) information. To further investigate whether the temporal ordering 
of different types of information influences the order in which it is processed, a future 
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study could systematically manipulate the temporal intervals in which effort and value 
information is presented. This would allow for a more detailed assessment of whether 
extrinsic/effort information is generally prioritized.  
Conclusions 
 Value based decisions often require sampling between intrinsic and extrinsic 
sources of information, and this is often accomplished through a series of fixations. Few 
studies have examined whether intrinsic and extrinsic information is processed in a serial 
or parallel manner, and how the nature of these stages of processing contributes to choice 
behavior. The current work clarifies this by employing a value based decision task where 
subjects often had to reconcile between extrinsic (effort) and intrinsic (value) sources of 
information. We demonstrated through fixation behaviors that information about effort 
and value is processed serially, with an initial prioritization of effort information, 
followed by the additive processing of value information, and then finally with the 
integration of effort and value information into a signal that likely represents the cost-
benefit difference of the items under consideration. Further, this integrated signal was 
predictive of subsequent choice in the task. This work extends previous work by 
providing a temporally precise method to characterize the dynamics of the online 
processing of extrinsic and intrinsic sources of value information.  
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CHAPTER VII 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The current work utilized behavioral, eye tracking, and neuroimaging methods to 
probe the underlying representations of decision variables (DVs) across a diverse set of 
tasks. The first study sought to examine what kind of information was represented in the 
feedback-related negativity (FRN), an event-related potential that has been shown across 
many studies to reflect the evaluation of ongoing events. This study was motivated by the 
fact that there is a degree of inconsistency regarding whether or not the FRN represents 
information about the valence, probability, or magnitude of outcomes. To address this, 
we developed a modified two-armed bandit task where we could study each of these 
sources of information simultaneously. Consistent with the overwhelming majority of 
previous work (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; San Martín, 
2012), the FRN robustly represented the valence of the outcome (i.e. losses vs. gains.). 
However, in contrast to two prominent theories that describe how the FRN should 
respond to the expectancy of an outcome (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002), we failed to observe any modulation of the FRN that could be attributed to 
outcome expectancy. This may have resulted from the fact that the task employed to 
measure the FRN explicitly provided subjects with information about the probability of 
outcomes, and did not require them to develop expectations by learning through trial and 
error, a key feature which may be required to see expectancy effects with the FRN 
(Holroyd et al., 2009). However, subject behavior suggested that they had fairly strong 
expectations about the likely outcomes of trials given that decisions to place high bets 
tracked the cued probability of gain on a trialwise basis. Finally, FRN amplitudes were 
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significantly modulated by the magnitude of outcomes, but this effect was qualified by an 
interaction that indicated that this was driven by the magnitude of gains rather than 
losses. At the very least, this study demonstrated that the FRN coarsely categorizes 
outcomes based on their relative “goodness” or “badness”, and may also represent the 
magnitudes of gains and losses asymmetrically, a result consistent with the types of 
utility functions that are proposed to contribute to attitudes like loss aversion (Fox & 
Poldrack, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 These asymmetric utility functions are the basis for Prospect Theory, which has 
demonstrated that losses are approximately twice as psychologically impactful as 
equivalent gains. However, it is unclear when this bias might occur during the processing 
of value information; does loss aversion manifest itself during the processing of 
individual elements of value information, or is it a bias that occurs only once all relevant 
information has been integrated? Furthermore, is loss aversion the result of a shift in the 
boundary that separates losses and gains that results in only the highest gains to be 
perceived as gains, or instead the result of an “all or none” processing of losses, with a 
selective sensitivity to the magnitude of gains (a result that would be consistent with 
asymmetric utility functions)? To this end, the second study investigated during what 
stage of processing (individual element or integrated stream) distortions in valuation like 
loss aversion might occur, as well as what kind of representation of gains and losses 
might be responsible for these distortions. We accomplished this by implementing a 
novel multi-sampling gambling task where optimal performance requires the processing 
of both individual elements from a stream of value information, as well as successful 
integration of this stream of information in order to make informed decisions of when to 
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gamble or play it safe. Subject behavior suggested that they were able to successfully 
track the expected value of the stream of loss and gain information and placed bets 
accordingly. Using multivariate pattern classification methods, we probed the 
informational content of delta power (which has been shown to be associated with 
information about both value and information integration (Bernat et al., 2015; Knyazev, 
2007; 2012; Wyart et al., 2012)) across the scalp in an attempt to map the 
representational space of losses and gains at both the individual element and stream level. 
At the element level, patterns of delta power suggested that losses and gains were 
represented in a purely categorical manner, with no indication of sensitivity to their 
magnitude. In contrast, at the stream level, losses were represented as “all or none” 
whereas gains showed magnitude sensitivity. Overall, these results suggest that biases 
such as loss aversion may occur farther downstream during the processing of an 
integrated value signal, rather than rather than during the processing of the discrete 
elements of information that contributed to that signal. Furthermore, this study provides 
further support that loss aversion is best characterized by asymmetric utility functions for 
losses and gains. 
 Although value is often associated with intrinsic properties of the item items 
under consideration (i.e. taste, appearance, etc.), value can also be affected by properties 
that are extrinsic to the item, such as the cost or effort associated with attaining the item 
(Rangel & Hare, 2010). There are many instances where there are multiple sources of 
information that help shape the perception of value of an item; perhaps the most intuitive 
way to conceptualize this is via the tradeoff of intrinsic benefits vs. extrinsic costs. A 
large body of work has suggested that we extract relevant value information form the 
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environment by continuously sampling items under consideration through visual fixations 
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Rangel et al., 2008). What remains unclear is whether or not 
information about value and effort are processed in the same manner, as well as when and 
how these two types of information are integrated during the decision process. To further 
investigate this, we utilized a task where subjects had to make decisions between pairs of 
food items where in some cases subjects were provided with the foreknowledge that one 
of the items was associated with an effortful math task. This approach allowed us to look 
at the dynamics of fixation behavior to determine whether effort and value information 
are processed serially or in parallel, as well when (if at all) the two types of information 
are integrated in a manner that is meaningful to choice behavior. Overall, the results 
suggested that fixation behavior prioritized the processing of effort information during 
initial stages of the decision phase, with no modulation by the value of the item; early eye 
fixations were rapidly drawn to items that had been pre-cued to be associated with math. 
This likely represented an overall tendency to determine whether the item was worth the 
effort of having to complete a difficult math problem. Middle fixations showed a tradeoff 
between effort and value information; fixations were less likely to be drawn to math, and 
more likely to be drawn to the valued item. Importantly, for middle fixations, the effect of 
value was additive, and effort and value did not have an interactive effect on fixations. 
Finally, during late fixations, effort and value interacted in a manner likely reflected the 
degree of conflict between the two. Specifically, during late fixations, the preferred item 
was just as likely to be looked at during both the math and no math conditions. In 
contrast, fixations to the non-preferred item were overall less likely in the no math 
condition compared to the math condition. The dynamics of fixations over time suggest 
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that effort and value are processed independently and serially during the early and middle 
stages of the decision process. However, during the later stage of the process, the two 
types of information are integrated and considered simultaneously. If fixation patterns 
during this later stage reflect a decision-relevant variable where effort and value are being 
considered simultaneously, it would stand to reason that fixations during this period 
predict choice behavior. Indeed, the interaction between effort, value, and fixations only 
predicted choice during the late period, but nor during the early or middle periods, 
suggesting that the different types of information need to be normalized to a common 
scale to effectively guide behavior (Chib et al., 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Rangel et 
al., 2008).   
 This body of work provides several insights regarding the nature of key decision-
relevant variables. Studies one and two found that underlying representations of losses 
and gains indicate that they are categorically distinct from one another, and that the 
underlying representations of losses and gains may be derived from two independent 
sources of information. In study one, the FRN distinguished between gains and losses 
following feedback in a gambling task, an effect that has been replicated across many 
studies (Bellebaum et al., 2010; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; 
Holroyd et al., 2004; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997; Weinberg, Luhmann, 
Bress, & Hajcak, 2012), Study two found that when probing the informational content of 
delta power, there was a sharp categorical boundary between losses and gains; losses 
were much more likely to be confused with other losses rather than gains, and vice versa.  
Taken together, studies two and three suggest that constructs like rewards and 
 84 
 
punishments may actually represent two independent sources of information, rather than 
a single dimension with rewards and punishment at opposite ends. 
 Studies one and two also provide supporting evidence that losses and gains are 
represented asymmetrically, consistent with Prospect Theory (Fox & Poldrack, 2008; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Both studies showed that losses are treated in an “all or 
none” manner, with no sensitivity to their magnitude. In contrast, there seems to a be a 
selective sensitivity to the magnitude of gains (this was only present at the stream level in 
study two). It is important to highlight that this general pattern was observed using two 
very distinct neural measures: the fronto-central FRN, and the distribution of delta power 
across the entire scalp. Perhaps even more striking is that the observed loss/gain 
asymmetries not only occurred with distinct neural measures, they occurred during two 
distinct stages of decision making. In the case of study one, asymmetries were present 
during post-choice feedback period, whereas in study two, the asymmetries were present 
during the pre-choice decision period. Together, these findings suggest that evidence for 
biases such as loss aversion can be found along various points of the decision making 
process, but the biases only occur when all the subject has integrated all relevant 
loss/gain information. 
 Study three provided evidence that suggests that different types of decision-
relevant information (i.e. effort vs. value) are processed serially. Furthermore, study three 
shows that they are processed independently during early stages of the decision process. 
This result reinforces the idea discrete sources of information are considered 
independently, and may exist as entirely separate dimensions. As highlighted earlier, 
losses and gains may exist within the context of completely independent and 
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unidirectional scales of punishment and reward. Likewise, value (i.e. reward) and effort 
may be represented in a similar fashion. Early processing of effort and reward does not 
immediately show integration of the two types of information; this only begins to show 
during the later periods of the decision process. Thus, early processing seems to reflect a 
more modular and independent representation of information which is later integrated 
into a DV. As seen in study two, it is during this later integration phase that biases in the 
representation of that information might occur. 
 Although the current work provides evidence to suggest how decision-relevant 
information may be processed independently (at least initially), future work could 
investigate the limits of this. In each study, we provided subjects with at most three types 
of information to consider (valence, probability, magnitude; study 1). In reality however, 
some decisions are much more complex. For example, deciding whether or not to uproot 
your family by accepting a job in another city. Does the number of different types of 
information to consider have any impact on the ability to process them independently? Is 
there a capacity limit to how much decision-relevant information you can process in a 
modular manner, similar to a capacity limit for working memory (Unsworth, Fukuda, 
Awh, & Vogel, 2014)? Is there a point where decision-relevant information immediately 
is chunked into coarse “good” and “bad” categories early in the decision process? These 
are all open questions that could be addressed with further research, and would provide 
valuable insight to the underlying computations necessary for decision making. 
 Among the most common types of decisions that humans engage in are value 
based decisions. The current work sought to further investigate value based decision 
making by probing the nature of how information is represented using behavioral, 
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neuroimaging, and eye tracking methods. This approach allows us to obtain a more 
comprehensive and complete picture of the underlying processes and computations that 
give rise to this fundamental aspect of our experience. Overall, this work advances the 
field by providing additional insight about how decision-relevant information is 
represented in a dynamic and flexible manner. 
  
 87 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
Alexander, W. H., & Brown, J. W. (2011). Medial prefrontal cortex as an action-outcome 
predictor. Nature Neuroscience, 14(10), 1338–1344. http://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2921 
 
Anderson, B. A. (2013). A value-driven mechanism of attentional selection. Journal of 
Vision, 13(3), 7–7. http://doi.org/10.1167/13.3.7 
 
Armel, K. C., Beaumel, A., & Rangel, A. (2008). Biasing simple choices by manipulating 
relative visual attention. … And Decision Making. 
 
Banis, S., & Lorist, M. M. (2012). Acute noise stress impairs feedback processing. 
Biological Psychology, 91(2), 163–171. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2012.06.009 
 
Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects 
Models Using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1–48. 
http://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01 
 
Bellebaum, C., Polezzi, D., & Daum, I. (2010). It is less than you expected: the feedback-
related negativity reflects violations of reward magnitude expectations. 
Neuropsychologia, 48(11), 3343–3350. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.07.023 
 
Bernat, E. M., Nelson, L. D., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2015). Time-frequency theta 
and delta measures index separable components of feedback processing in a 
gambling task. Psychophysiology, n/a–n/a. http://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12390 
 
Botvinick, M., Weinstein, A., Solway, A., & Barto, A. (2015). Reinforcement learning, 
efficient coding, and the statistics of natural tasks. Current Opinion in Behavioral 
Sciences, 5(C), 71–77. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.08.009 
 
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10(4), 433–436. 
http://doi.org/10.1163/156856897x00357 
 
Canessa, N., Crespi, C., Motterlini, M., Baud-Bovy, G., Chierchia, G., Pantaleo, G., et al. 
(2013). The functional and structural neural basis of individual differences in loss 
aversion. The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the Society for 
Neuroscience, 33(36), 14307–14317. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0497-
13.2013 
 
Cavanagh, J. F., Frank, M. J., Klein, T. J., & Allen, J. J. B. (2010). Frontal theta links 
prediction errors to behavioral adaptation in reinforcement learning. NeuroImage, 
49(4), 3198–3209. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.11.080 
 
 
 88 
 
Chib, V. S., Rangel, A., Shimojo, S., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2009). Evidence for a common 
representation of decision values for dissimilar goods in human ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the Society 
for Neuroscience, 29(39), 12315–12320. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2575-
09.2009 
 
Cohen, M. X., & Cavanagh, J. F. (2011). Single-Trial Regression Elucidates the Role of 
Prefrontal Theta Oscillations in Response Conflict. Frontiers in Psychology, 2. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00030 
 
Cohen, M. X., Elger, C. E., & Ranganath, C. (2007). Reward expectation modulates 
feedback-related negativity and EEG spectra. NeuroImage, 35(2), 968–978. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.11.056 
 
Cornelissen, F. W., Peters, E. M., & Palmer, J. (2002). The Eyelink Toolbox: Eye 
tracking with MATLAB and the Psychophysics Toolbox. Behavior Research 
Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 34(4), 613–617. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195489 
 
Delorme, A., & Makeig, S. (2004). EEGLAB: an open source toolbox for analysis of 
single-trial EEG dynamics including independent component analysis. Journal of 
Neuroscience Methods, 134(1), 9–21. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2003.10.009 
 
Ferdinand, N. K., Mecklinger, A., Kray, J., & Gehring, W. J. (2012). The Processing of 
Unexpected Positive Response Outcomes in the Mediofrontal Cortex, 32(35), 12087–
12092. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1410 
 
Foti, D., Weinberg, A., Bernat, E. M., & Proudfit, G. H. (2015). Anterior cingulate 
activity to monetary loss and basal ganglia activity to monetary gain uniquely 
contribute to the feedback negativity. Clinical Neurophysiology : Official Journal of 
the International Federation of Clinical Neurophysiology, 126(7), 1338–1347. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.clinph.2014.08.025 
 
Fox, C. R., & Poldrack, R. A. (2008). Prospect theory and the brain. Handbook of 
Neuroeconomics. 
 
Gehring, W. J., & Willoughby, A. R. (2002). The medial frontal cortex and the rapid 
processing of monetary gains and losses. Science (New York, N.Y.), 295(5563), 
2279–2282. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1066893 
 
Gehring, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., Meyer, D. E., & Donchin, E. (1993). A Neural 
System for Error Detection and Compensation. Psychological Science, 4(6), 385–
390. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00586.x 
 
 
 
 89 
 
Gu, R., Lei, Z., Broster, L., Wu, T., Jiang, Y., & Luo, Y.-J. (2011). Beyond valence and 
magnitude: a flexible evaluative coding system in the brain. Neuropsychologia, 
49(14), 3891–3897. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.10.006 
 
Hajcak, G., Holroyd, C. B., Moser, J. S., & Simons, R. F. (2005). Brain potentials 
associated with expected and unexpected good and bad outcomes. Psychophysiology, 
42(2), 161–170. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2005.00278.x 
 
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., Holroyd, C. B., & Simons, R. F. (2006). The feedback-related 
negativity reflects the binary evaluation of good versus bad outcomes. Biological 
Psychology, 71(2), 148–154. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.04.001 
 
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., Holroyd, C. B., & Simons, R. F. (2007). It's worse than you 
thought: the feedback negativity and violations of reward prediction in gambling 
tasks. Psychophysiology, 44(6), 905–912. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2007.00567.x 
 
Hare, T. A., Malmaud, J., & Rangel, A. (2011). Focusing Attention on the Health Aspects 
of Foods Changes Value Signals in vmPFC and Improves Dietary Choice. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 31(30), 11077–11087. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6383-
10.2011 
 
Harris, A., & Lim, S. L. (2016). Temporal Dynamics of Sensorimotor Networks in 
Effort-Based Cost-Benefit Valuation: Early Emergence and Late Net Value 
Integration. Journal of Neuroscience, 36(27), 7167–7183. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4016-15.2016 
 
Harris, A., Adolphs, R., Camerer, C., & Rangel, A. (2011). Dynamic Construction of 
Stimulus Values in the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex. PloS One, 6(6), e21074. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0021074 
 
Hauser, T. U., Iannaccone, R., Stämpfli, P., Drechsler, R., Brandeis, D., Walitza, S., & 
Brem, S. (2014). The feedback-related negativity (FRN) revisited: New insights into 
the localization, meaning and network organization. NeuroImage, 84(C), 159–168. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.08.028 
 
Haxby, J. V., Gobbini, M. I., Furey, M. L., Ishai, A., Schouten, J. L., & Pietrini, P. 
(2001). Distributed and overlapping representations of faces and objects in ventral 
temporal cortex. Science, 293(5539), 2425–2430. 
http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1063736 
 
Hewig, J., Trippe, R., Hecht, H., Coles, M. G. H., Holroyd, C. B., & Miltner, W. H. R. 
(2007). Decision-making in Blackjack: an electrophysiological analysis. Cerebral 
Cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991), 17(4), 865–877. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhk040 
 
 90 
 
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The Neural Basis of Human Error Processing : 
Reinforcement Learning , Dopamine , and the Error-Related Negativity. 
Psychological Review, 109(4), 679–709. http://doi.org/10.1037//0033-
295X.109.4.679 
 
Holroyd, C. B., Krigolson, O. E., Baker, R., Lee, S., & Gibson, J. (2009). When is an 
error not a prediction error? An electrophysiological investigation. Cognitive, 
Affective \& Behavioral Neuroscience, 9(1), 59–70. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.9.1.59 
 
Holroyd, C. B., Larsen, J. T., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). Context dependence of the event-
related brain potential associated with reward and punishment. Psychophysiology, 
41(2), 245–253. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2004.00152.x 
 
Holroyd, C. B., Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). Errors in reward 
prediction are reflected in the event-related brain potential. Neuroreport, 14(18), 
2481–2484. http://doi.org/10.1097/01.wnr.0000099601.41403.a5 
 
Holroyd, C. B., Pakzad-Vaezi, K. L., & Krigolson, O. E. (2008). The feedback correct-
related positivity: sensitivity of the event-related brain potential to unexpected 
positive feedback. Psychophysiology, 45(5), 688–697. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2008.00668.x 
 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263. http://doi.org/10.2307/1914185 
 
Kamarajan, C., Porjesz, B., Rangaswamy, M., Tang, Y., Chorlian, D. B., 
Padmanabhapillai, A., et al. (2009). Brain signatures of monetary loss and gain: 
outcome-related potentials in a single outcome gambling task. Behavioural Brain 
Research, 197(1), 62–76. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2008.08.011 
 
Klein-Flugge, M. C., Kennerley, S. W., Friston, K., & Bestmann, S. (2016). Neural 
Signatures of Value Comparison in Human Cingulate Cortex during Decisions 
Requiring an Effort-Reward Trade-off. Journal of Neuroscience, 36(39), 10002–
10015. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0292-16.2016 
 
Knutson, B., Rick, S., Wimmer, G. E., Prelec, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2007). Neural 
Predictors of Purchases. Neuron, 53(1), 147–156. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2006.11.010 
 
Knyazev, G. G. (2007). Motivation, emotion, and their inhibitory control mirrored in 
brain oscillations. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 31(3), 377–395. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2006.10.004 
 
 
 
 91 
 
Knyazev, G. G. (2012). EEG delta oscillations as a correlate of basic homeostatic and 
motivational processes. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(1), 677–695. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.10.002 
 
Kokmotou, K., Cook, S., Xie, Y., Wright, H., Soto, V., Fallon, N., et al. (2017). Effects 
of loss aversion on neural responses to loss outcomes: An event-related potential 
study. Biological Psychology, 126, 30–40. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2017.04.005 
 
Krajbich, I., & Rangel, A. (2011). Multialternative drift-diffusion model predicts the 
relationship between visual fixations and choice in value-based decisions. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
108(33), 13852–13857. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1101328108 
 
Krajbich, I., Armel, K. C., & Rangel, A. (2010). Visual fixations and the computation and 
comparison of value in simple choice. Nature Neuroscience, 13(10), 1292–1298. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2635 
 
Krajbich, I., Lu, D., Camerer, C., & Rangel, A. (2012). The attentional drift-diffusion 
model extends to simple purchasing decisions. Frontiers in Psychology, 3(June), 193. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00193 
 
Kriegeskorte, N. (2008). Representational similarity analysis – connecting the branches 
of systems neuroscience. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 1–28. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/neuro.06.004.2008 
 
Kriegeskorte, N., Mur, M., Ruff, D. A., Kiani, R., Bodurka, J., Esteky, H., et al. (2008). 
Matching Categorical Object Representations in Inferior Temporal Cortex of Man 
and Monkey. Neuron, 60(6), 1126–1141. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.10.043 
 
Levy, D. J., & Glimcher, P. W. (2012). The root of all value: a neural common currency 
for choice. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 22(6), 1027–1038. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2012.06.001 
 
Lim, S. L., O'Doherty, J. P., & Rangel, A. (2011). The Decision Value Computations in 
the vmPFC and Striatum Use a Relative Value Code That is Guided by Visual 
Attention. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(37), 13214–13223. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1246-11.2011 
 
Martin, L. E., & Potts, G. F. (2011). Medial frontal event-related potentials and reward 
prediction: Do responses matter? Brain and Cognition, 77(1), 128–134. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2011.04.001 
 
 
 
 
 92 
 
Miltner, W., Braun, C. H., & Coles, M. (1997). Event-related brain potentials following 
incorrect feedback in a time-estimation task: Evidence for a “generic” neural system 
for error detection. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9(6), 788–798. 
http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.1997.9.6.788 
 
Nieuwenhuis, S., Holroyd, C. B., Mol, N., & Coles, M. G. H. (2004). Reinforcement-
related brain potentials from medial frontal cortex: origins and functional 
significance. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 28(4), 441–448. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2004.05.003 
 
Norman, K. A., Polyn, S. M., Detre, G. J., & Haxby, J. V. (2006). Beyond mind-reading: 
multi-voxel pattern analysis of fMRI data. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(9), 424–
430. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.07.005 
 
Oliveira, F. T. P., McDonald, J. J., & Goodman, D. (2007). Performance monitoring in 
the anterior cingulate is not all error related: expectancy deviation and the 
representation of action-outcome associations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
19(12), 1994–2004. http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2007.19.12.1994 
 
Plassmann, H., O'Doherty, J. P., & Rangel, A. (2010). Appetitive and Aversive Goal 
Values Are Encoded in the Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex at the Time of Decision 
Making. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(32), 10799–10808. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0788-10.2010 
 
Platt, M. L., & Glimcher, P. W. (1999). Neural correlates of decision variables in parietal 
cortex. Nature, 400(6741), 233–238. http://doi.org/10.1038/22268 
 
Polanía, R., Krajbich, I., Grueschow, M., & Ruff, C. C. (2014). Neural Oscillations and 
Synchronization Differentially Support Evidence Accumulation in Perceptual and 
Value-Based Decision Making. Neuron, 82(3), 709–720. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2014.03.014 
 
Polanía, R., Moisa, M., Opitz, A., Grueschow, M., & Ruff, C. C. (2015). The precision of 
value-based choices depends causally on fronto-parietal phase coupling. Nature 
Communications, 6, 8090. http://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms9090 
 
Prévost, C., Pessiglione, M., Météreau, E., Cléry-Melin, M.-L., & Dreher, J.-C. (2010). 
Separate valuation subsystems for delay and effort decision costs. The Journal of 
Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 30(42), 14080–
14090. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2752-10.2010 
 
Proudfit, G. H. (2015). The reward positivity: From basic research on reward to a 
biomarker for depression. Psychophysiology, 52(4), 449–459. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12370 
 
R Core Team. (2016). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. 
 93 
 
Rangel, A., & Hare, T. (2010). Neural computations associated with goal-directed choice. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 20(2), 262–270. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2010.03.001 
 
Rangel, A., Camerer, C., & Montague, P. R. (2008). A framework for studying the 
neurobiology of value-based decision making. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 9(7), 
545–556. http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2357 
 
Sambrook, T. D., & Goslin, J. (2014). Mediofrontal event-related potentials in response 
to positive, negative and unsigned prediction errors. Neuropsychologia, 61(C), 1–10. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.06.004 
 
Sambrook, T. D., & Goslin, J. (2015). A neural reward prediction error revealed by a 
meta-analysis of ERPs using great grand averages. Psychological Bulletin, 141(1), 
213–235. http://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000006 
 
San Martín, R. (2012). Event-related potential studies of outcome processing and 
feedback-guided learning. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00304 
 
San Martín, R., Kwak, Y., Pearson, J. M., Woldorff, M. G., & Huettel, S. A. (2016). 
Altruistic traits are predicted by neural responses to monetary outcomes for self 
versus charity. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11(6), nsw026–14. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw026 
 
San Martín, René, Appelbaum, L. G., Pearson, J. M., Huettel, S. A., & Woldorff, M. G. 
(2013). Rapid brain responses independently predict gain maximization and loss 
minimization during economic decision making. The Journal of Neuroscience : the 
Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 33(16), 7011–7019. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.4242-12.2013 
 
San Martín, René, Manes, F., Hurtado, E., Isla, P., & Ibañez, A. (2010). Size and 
probability of rewards modulate the feedback error-related negativity associated with 
wins but not losses in a monetarily rewarded gambling task. NeuroImage. 
 
Santesso, D. L., Dzyundzyak, A., & Segalowitz, S. J. (2011). Age, sex and individual 
differences in punishment sensitivity: Factors influencing the feedback-related 
negativity. Psychophysiology, 48(11), 1481–1489. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2011.01229.x 
Shadlen, M. N., & Kiani, R. (2013). Decision Making as a Window on Cognition. 
Neuron, 80(3), 791–806. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.10.047 
 
Silvetti, M., Castellar, E. N., Roger, C., & Verguts, T. (2014). Reward expectation and 
prediction error in human medial frontal cortex: An EEG study. NeuroImage, 84(C), 
376–382. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.08.058 
 
 94 
 
Stanton, S. J., Mullette-Gillman, O. A., McLaurin, R. E., Kuhn, C. M., LaBar, K. S., 
Platt, M. L., & Huettel, S. A. (2011). Low- and High-Testosterone Individuals 
Exhibit Decreased Aversion to Economic Risk. Psychological Science, 22(4), 447–
453. http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611401752 
 
Talmi, D., Atkinson, R., & El-Deredy, W. (2013). The feedback-related negativity signals 
salience prediction errors, not reward prediction errors. The Journal of Neuroscience 
: the Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 33(19), 8264–8269. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5695-12.2013 
 
Tom, S. M., Fox, C. R., Trepel, C., & Poldrack, R. A. (2007). The neural basis of loss 
aversion in decision-making under risk. Science (New York, N.Y.), 315(5811), 515–
518. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1134239 
 
Towal, R. B., Mormann, M., & Koch, C. (2013). Simultaneous modeling of visual 
saliency and value computation improves predictions of economic choice. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(40), E3858–E3867. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1304429110 
 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of 
choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458. 
 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039–1061. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2937956 
 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/41755005?ref=search-
gateway:4016cc49e7a26b1170191726c2331a71 
 
Unsworth, N., Fukuda, K., Awh, E., & Vogel, E. K. (2014). Working memory and fluid 
intelligence: Capacity, attention control, and secondary memory retrieval. Cognitive 
Psychology, 71(C), 1–26. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2014.01.003 
 
Walsh, M. M., & Anderson, J. R. (2011). Modulation of the feedback-related negativity 
by instruction and experience, 2011, 1–6. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1117189108/-
/DCSupplemental.www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1117189108 
 
Walsh, M. M., & Anderson, J. R. (2012). Learning from experience: event-related 
potential correlates of reward processing, neural adaptation, and behavioral choice. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(8), 1870–1884. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.05.008 
 
 
 
 95 
 
Weinberg, A., Luhmann, C. C., Bress, J. N., & Hajcak, G. (2012). Better late than never? 
The effect of feedback delay on ERP indices of reward processing. Cognitive, 
Affective \& Behavioral Neuroscience, 12(4), 671–677. 
 
Wyart, V., de Gardelle, V., Scholl, J., & Summerfield, C. (2012). Rhythmic Fluctuations 
in Evidence Accumulation during Decision Making in the Human Brain. Neuron, 
76(4), 847–858. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.09.015 
 
Yechiam, E., & Hochman, G. (2013). Loss-aversion or loss-attention: The impact of 
losses on cognitive performance. Cognitive Psychology, 66(2), 212–231. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2012.12.001 
 
Yeung, N., Holroyd, C. B., & Cohen, J. D. (2005). ERP correlates of feedback and 
reward processing in the presence and absence of response choice. Cerebral Cortex 
(New York, N.Y. : 1991), 15(5), 535–544. http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhh153 
 
Zani, A., & Proverbio, A. M. (2003). Reinforcement Learning Signals Predict Future 
Decisions. Academic Press. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4421-06.2007 
 
 
